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In the United States, police officers are granted a license to use lethal 
force and are subsequently exonerated from personal criminal liability for 
fatal killings, particularly when the victim is an African American.  This 
Article advances the normative claim that the Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence, including the “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment, protects the victims of police homicides.  Further, it 
contends that the police use of lethal force against African Americans 
constitutes “lynching”—a State-sponsored act of terror that supports 
systemic racism.  Finally, it posits that the Constitution mandates that the 
                                                 
 1. J.D., Yale Law 1981; M.A., Oxford 1985; Distinguished Henry F. Bonura, Jr. 
Professor, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.  Thanks to Loyola students 
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police use of lethal force be abolished—a transformative solution to save 




In Louisville, on March 13, 2020, Breonna Taylor, a twenty-six-year-
old Black2 female emergency room technician, was slain while asleep in her 
bed in her home.3  Taylor was killed by at least eight of the more than twenty 
bullets fired by three white male plainclothes police officers who used a 
battering ram to force open the door while raiding her home pursuant to a 
no-knock warrant.4 
In Minneapolis, on May 25, 2020, the media broadcasted a cellphone 
video of four police officers detaining a Black male who was handcuffed and 
lying face down in the street.5  One white6 male officer continuously pressed 
his knee to the man’s neck, while two white male officers applied their knees 
to his back and legs, as another male police officer looked on.7  The detained 
man repeatedly cried out, “I can’t breathe.”8  The chokehold lasted for eight 
                                                 
 2. This Article capitalizes the “B” in “Black,” when referring to Americans of the 
African diaspora.  See generally Kwame Anthony Appiah, Opinion, The Case for Capitalizing 
the B in Black, THE ATLANTIC (June 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 
2020/06/time-to-capitalize-blackand-white/613159/; Dean Baquet et al., Uppercasing 
‘Black’, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020), https://www.nytco.com/press/uppercasing-black/ 
(announcing that the New York Times is capitalizing the word “Black” when describing 
people and cultures of African origin).  Throughout this Article, I intentionally interchange 
the use of the words “Black” and “African American. 
 3. See Arian Campos-Flores et al., Police Killing of Breonna Taylor Fuels Calls to End 
No-Knock Warrants, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/police-
killing-of-breonna-taylor-fuels-calls-to-end-no-knock-warrants-11590332400.  Black women 
are victims of varying forms of police brutality, including fatal shootings, rape, and maiming.  
See Mary-Elizabeth Murphy, Black Women Are the Victims of Police Violence, Too, WASH. 
POST (July 24, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/ 
24/police-violence-happens-against-women-too/.  See generally KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET 
AL., SAY HER NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN (2016). 
 4. Campos-Flores et. al., supra note 2. 
 5. Evan Hill, 8 Minutes and 46 Seconds: How George Floyd Was Killed in Police 
Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-
floyd-investigation.html?auth=login-email&login=email (George Floyd was arrested for 
allegedly passing a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill) 
 6. This Article intentionally notes that the officers who kill Blacks, particularly Black 
males, are white males, which raises masculinity issues that are beyond the scope of this 
Article.  See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry 
Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671 (2009) (examining how 
masculinity contests specifically, and masculinities studies generally, affect policing). 
 7. Hill, supra note 4. 
 8. Id. 
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minutes and forty-six seconds, resulting in the man’s death.9  That person’s 
name was George Floyd.10 
In Atlanta, on June 12, 2020, Rayshard Brooks, a twenty-seven-year-
old Black male, was shot and killed by a white male police officer.11  Brooks 
was shot twice in the back as he ran away from two police officers.  His 
crime was “driving” while intoxicated, despite being asleep and parked in a 
Wendy’s drive thru.12 
The police killings of Rayshard Brooks, George Floyd, and Breonna 
Taylor13 compel examination of the legality and the morality of the police 
use of lethal force—raising disturbing questions about racial animus, 
systemic racism, and institutional racism against Blacks.14  In response to 
these questions, this Article contends that the police use of deadly force 
serves two purposes: first, it terminates the life of a Black person, usually a 
male, who refused to readily submit to police authority, and second, it 
terrorizes Blacks and thereby reinforces white supremacy.  Thus, the police 
use of lethal force is both a moral issue and legal crisis that needs a 
transformative solution. 
The recent police killings of Blacks, along with similar recent 
atrocities,15 have re-ignited the Black Lives Matter Movement (the 
“Movement”).16  The Movement demands an end to racial injustice and 
                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Helena Oliviero et al., Who Was Rayshard Brooks?, THE ATL. J. CONST. (June 14, 
2020), https://www.ajc.com/lifestyles/who-was-rayshard-brooks/lWjd3oZvR5D9QZywptiGkP/. 
 12. Id. 
 13. These recent questionable uses of lethal force join those of Michael Brown, Tamir 
Rice, Trayvon Martin, Rodney King, and so many others. 
 14. See infra Part I, B. 
 15. For example, near Brunswick, Georgia, on February 23, 2020, Ahmaud Arbery, a 
Black male, was jogging when two white males, claiming they acted as civilian law 
enforcement, shot and killed him.  See Richard Fausset, What We Know About the Shooting 
Death of Ahmaud Arbery, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ 
ahmaud-arbery-shooting-georgia.html.  
In Aurora, Colorado, on August 24, 2019, Elijah McClain, a 23-year-old Black male, while 
walking home and unarmed, was stopped by white police officers.  One officer placed 
McClain into a carotid hold, cutting off the flow of oxygen to his brain.  Paramedics gave 
McClain ketamine to sedate him, while the officers held him down for fifteen minutes as 
McClain went into cardiac arrest.  McClain was declared brain dead on August 30, 2019.  See 
Stephanie Guerilus, After Elijah McClain Was Killed by Police, a Petition Signed by More 
than 2M Seeks Justice, THE GRIO (June 24, 2020, 6:10 PM), https://www.aol.com/article/ 
news/2020/06/24/after-elijah-mcclain-was-killed-by-police-a-petition-signed-by-more-than-
2m-seeks-justice/24535890/ 
 16. See Alicia Garza, A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement by Alicia Garza, 
THE FEMINIST WIRE (Oct. 7, 2014), https://thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2/; 
Herstory, BLACKLIVESMATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory/ (“Black Lives Matter 
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oppression in America, with a particular emphasis on stopping police 
brutality against Black people17 and eradicating systemic racism.18  The 
Movement is now a global protest of the police use of lethal force against 
Blacks.19 
Unfortunately, the Movement faces a conundrum—(1) that police 
officers20 are authorized to use deadly or “lethal force,”21 (2) that police 
                                                 
is an ideological and political intervention in a world where Black lives are systematically 
and intentionally targeted for demise.  It is an affirmation of Black folks’ humanity, our 
contributions to this society, and our resilience in the face of deadly oppression”).  Parallel 
components of the Movement are the #BlackGirlsMatter and #SayHerName movements.  See 
also Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw et al., Black Girls Matter: Pushed Out, Overpoliced and 
Underprotected, AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM (2015), https://www.atlanticphilanthrop 
ies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/BlackGirlsMatter_Report.pdf; Say Her Name, Resisting 
Police Brutality Against Black Women, AFRICAN AM. POLICY FORUM (2015), http:// 
static1.squarespace.com/static/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/560c068ee4b0af26f72741df/1
443628686535/AAPF_SMN_Brief_Full_singles-min.pdf. 
 17. White male police officers’ killings of Black males raise particular concern.  See 
Sandhya Somashekhar et al., Black and Unarmed, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/08/08/black-and-unarmed (noting that unarmed Black 
males are seven times more likely than whites to die by police gunfire). 
 18. “Systemic racism,” for purposes of this Article, refers to the conscious and 
unconscious institutionalization of and the continuation of the oppression of Blacks.  See infra 
Part III, B.  Another example of systemic racism is the failure to properly investigate and to 
solve homicides of Blacks, from any perpetrator.  See, e.g., Wesley Lowery et al., Murder 
with Impunity: An Unequal Justice, WASH. POST (July 25, 2018), https://www.washington 
post.com/graphics/2018/investigations/black-homicides-arrests/?noredirect=on&utm_term 
=.281edee23750.  See generally Paul Butler, Race and Adjudication, 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 211-26 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (2018), http://academyforjustice.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/10/10_Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3._Race-and-Adjudication.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/7Q6N-2JX3]; Terry Gross, Policing Is the ‘Avatar of American Racism,’ 
Marshall Project Journalist Says, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: FRESH AIR (June 10, 2020, 2:09 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/873564620/policing-is-an-avatar-of-american-racism-mar 
shall-project-journalist-says. 
 19. See infra Part I, B. 
 20. “Police officer(s),” for purposes of this Article, is defined as law enforcement 
personnel, who maintain public order, safety and health, and enforcement of laws and possess 
executive, judicial, and legislative powers, including police officers, sheriffs, prison guards, 
security guards, highway patrols, militia, and people acting in such roles. 
 21. “Lethal force,” for purposes of this Article, refers to the amount of force, deployed 
by a police officer, that is likely to cause either serious bodily harm or death to another person, 
or actually causes serious injury or death to another person. Lethal force includes shooting of 
firearms, chokehold, strangulation, stun guns aka Tasers, shooting rubber bullets, attack dogs, 
the injection of ketamine, aggravated assault, simple battery, no-knock raids, and failing to 
come to a person’s aid in a timely manner.  See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATT’Y GEN. OCTOBER 
17, 1995 MEMORANDUM ON RESOLUTION 14 (ATTACHMENT): COMMENTARY REGARDING THE 
USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN NON-CUSTODIAL SITUATIONS https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/ 
attorney-general-october-17-1995-memorandum-resolution-14-attachment-1 (last updated 
Mar. 8, 2017) (defining deadly force as the use of any force that is “likely to cause death or 
serious physical injury”). 
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officers not only kill people,22 but the legal system condones those killings, 
particularly when the victims are Black,23 and (3) that police officers who 
kill Blacks are seldom prosecuted and are rarely, if ever, convicted for 
homicide.24  Such a lack of accountability of deadly force results in negative 
consequences—injustice for the victims and their families,25 harm and fear 
for future victims,26 and increased risk for police officers.27 
In response to this crisis, this Article uniquely challenges the 
constitutionality of the police use of lethal force28 by analyzing the policies 
and Supreme Court doctrines that permit the killing of innocent Blacks.29  It 
                                                 
 22. See infra Part I, A. 
 23. See infra Part I, C. 
 24. See infra Part I, C.  The police officers who killed George Floyd and Rayshard 
Brooks have been arrested and indicted for the killings, while only one officer was charged 
in the case of Breonna Taylor for “wanton endangerment.”  Of note, no officers were charged 
with her actual killing.  See Brittany Shammas et al., Murder Charges Filed Against All Four 
Officers in George Floyd’s Death as Protests Against Bias Policing Continue, WASH. POST 
(June 3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/03/george-floyd-police-off 
icers-charges/; Faith Karimi et al., Atlanta Officers Turn Themselves in on Charges in the 
Death of Rayshard Brooks, CNN (last updated June 18, 2020), https://www.cnn. 
com/2020/06/18/us/rayshard-brooks-atlanta-shooting-thursday/index.html.  See Richard A. 
Oppel Jr. et al., Here’s What You Need to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html; see Rukmini 
Callimachi, et al., Fired Officer is Indicted in Breonna Taylor Case; Protestors Wanted 
Stronger Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/23/ 
us/breonna-taylor-officer-indicted.html. 
 25. No Accountability for Police Shootings, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://eji.org/news/history-racial-injustice-no-accountability-for-police-shootings/. 
 26. See generally Maquita Peters, Being Black in America: “We Have a Place in This 
World Too,” NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 5, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/05/ 
867060621/being-black-in-america-we-have-a-place-in-this-world-too; Amanda Graham et 
al., Race and Worrying About Police Brutality: The Hidden Injuries of Minority Status in 
America, VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 549–573 (2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ 
full/10.1080/15564886.2020.1767252 (reporting on a nationwide study that found that Blacks 
are five times more likely to fear police brutality than whites).  Racial profiling has a 
profoundly negative psychological impact on Black families, who fear for their safety and 
that of their family members and friends.  See, e.g., Chuck Henson, Reflections on Ferguson: 
What’s Wrong with Black People?, 80 MO. L. REV. 1013, 1013–19 (2015). 
 27. Lawrence Rosenthal, Police Violence Is Mostly Rooted in Fear. Ignoring That Makes 
Reform Harder, NBC NEWS (June 12, 2020, 3:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
think/opinion/police-violence-mostly-rooted-fear-ignoring-makes-reform-harder-ncna1230266; 
Martin Kaste, Police Officers Fear More For Their Safety, Pew Survey Finds, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO  (Jan. 11, 2017, 4:29 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/11/509361596/police-offic 
ers-fear-more-for-their-safety-pew-survey-finds. 
 28. See infra Part III, A (utilizing Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence to 
challenge the Supreme Court Fourth Amendment “search and seizure” jurisprudence views 
this issue as one of police officer’s accountability and the reasonability of using such force). 
 29. See infra Part III.  This Article challenges the constitutionality of police use of lethal 
force, focusing on the process that legalizes killings and not the personal accountability of the 
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advances the normative claim that the police use of lethal force is an 
unconstitutional violation of the victims’ right to life against State-
sponsored30 executions31 under the “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” 
Clause32 of the Eighth Amendment.33  Further, it contends that the police use 
of lethal force is modern-day “lynching”34—an act of terror that sustains 
                                                 
perpetrator.  While this Article argues that racism is baked into policing policies in this 
country, a police officer who kills a person should not be permitted to naively claim that they 
were just following protocol.  Cf. PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (Guénaël 
Mettraux, ed., 2008) (in the Nuremberg trials of Nazi leaders, the court refused to accept the 
just-following-orders defense to the Holocaust atrocities).  See also Jamie Ehrlich et al., 
Federal Judge Pens Scathing Opinion on Qualified Immunity: ‘Let Us Waste No Time in 
Righting This Wrong’, CNN (Aug. 4, 2020, 9:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/ 
04/politics/qualified-immunity-federal-judge/index.html (challenging qualified immunity’s 
application to police use of lethal force). 
 30. “State-sponsored,” for purposes of this Article, refers to actions authorized by and 
carried out on behalf of a State or the Federal governments. 
 31. “Execution(s),” for purposes of this Article, refers to a killing of a person by a state 
actor, that is, a person acting under the color of law, such as when a police officer kills a 
person during the course of performing their official duties.  This Article seeks to distinguish 
a “wrongful” execution, such as the police use of lethal force versus a “rightful” execution, 
such as when the State “executes” a person in compliance with constitutionally-prescribed 
due process and in a humane manner, such as carrying out of a sentence of death of a 
condemned person, including by lethal injection, electrocution, gas inhalation, hanging, and 
firing squad.  See infra Part III, A. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted”).  
See infra, Part III, A.  This Article refers to this and its ancillary constitutional provisions as 
“death penalty jurisprudence,” as defined, for purposes of this Article as “all constitutional 
and fundamental rights provisions, such as and including Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process, which protect a person against Government infringement of the sanctity of a 
person’s life.” 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  The Court’s Eighth Amendment death penalty 
jurisprudence is plagued by racial bias, resulting in innocent Blacks being sentenced to death 
and executed.  See NAACP Death Penalty Fact Sheet, NAACP (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www. 
naacp.org/latest/naacp-death-penalty-fact-sheet/; Racial Bias,  NAT’L COAL. TO ABOLISH THE 
DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org/pages/racial-bias (last visited July 23, 2020).  See 
also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1154 (1994) (Justice Blackmun dissenting, proclaimed 
that “[e]ven under the most sophisticated death penalty statutes, race continues to play a major 
role in determining who shall live and who shall die.”); Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279, 297 (1987) (holding that a pattern of racial disparities in the death penalty did not violate 
an individual’s constitutional right of “equal protection of the law”).  Cf. Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence relative to the use of lethal force in custodial cases.  See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, 
Inmate Litigation, 116  HARV L. REV 6 (2003) (providing one of the most comprehensive 
reviews of inmate litigation including those that pertained to conditions of confinement in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions and the 
Eighth Amendment, 84 NYU L. REV. 881 (2009) (examining when prison conditions would 
qualify as either “cruel” or “unusual” and how cruelty would be captured doctrinally for 
Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement analysis). 
 34. “Lynching,” for purposes of this Article, is defined as State-sanctioned executions 
aka punishments, which, under the pretext of administering justice, without trial, tortured and 
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systemic racism which presently and continuously35 kills, traumatizes, and 
subrogates Blacks.36 
This Article tests the thesis that the Eighth Amendment’s death penalty 
jurisprudence mandates the abolition of the police use of lethal force, in three 
parts, seriatim.  Part I explores the Black Lives Matter Movement’s demand 
for equal justice and an end to systemic racism, and it describes a conundrum 
that the Movement faces.  Next, Part II provides a transformative solution—
the absolute abolition of the police use of lethal force.  Part III argues that 
the solution is constitutionally mandated, and it is necessary to save Black 
lives and achieve equal justice. 
 
I. Unequal Justice 
 
In response to overwhelming evidence, including video recordings of 
unjustified and unaccountable police killings of Blacks,37 Part I explains the 
legal challenges that the Movement faces in achieving the goal of equal 
justice.38  It examines how police policies and practices promote the 
excessive use of lethal force, and it analyzes the true meaning of the phrase 
“Black Lives Matter.”  Lastly, it presents a conundrum facing the 
Movement—that despite the protests, police officers have and will continue 
to get away with killing Blacks, as illustrated in the gruesome, yet 
underreported, police mass shootings of Blacks in New Orleans during 
Hurricane Katrina, which this Article refers to as the Katrina Massacre.39 
                                                 
killed African American males, terrorizing Blacks and thereby maintaining white supremacy 
in the economic, social and political spheres.  Historically, the most commonly utilized form 
of lynching was noose-hanging a Black man from a tree.  See infra Part III, C. 
 35. See generally F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND 
QUESTIONS (4th ed. 2015); Larry Spruill, Slave Patrols, “Packs of Negro Dogs” and Policing 
Black Communities, 53 PHYLON 42–66 (2016).  
 36. See, e.g., To Make Them Stand in Fear, KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR 
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 141 (1956) (“here, then, was the way to 
produce the perfect slave: accustom him to rigid discipline, demand from him unconditional 
submission, impress upon him his innate inferiority, develop in him a paralyzing fear of white 
men, train him to adopt the master’s code of good behavior, and instill in him a sense of 
complete dependence”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 148.  See also Lisette Voytko, Viral 
Video Of Colorado Cops Holding Black Family At Gunpoint Ignites Outrage, Calls For 
Reform, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2020, 12:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisettevoytko/ 
2020/08/04/viral-video-of-colorado-cops-holding-black-family-at-gunpoint-ignites-outrage-
calls-for-reform/#335e71c074c5. 
 37. See generally Andrea Castillo, How Two Black Women in L.A. Helped Build Black 
Lives Matter from Hashtag to Global Movement, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-21/black-lives-matter-los-angeles-patriss 
e-cullors-melina-abdullah.  See also Crenshaw, supra note 15; Garza, supra note 15. 
 38. See supra note 15. 
 39. See infra Part I, C, 2. 
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A. Kill Policy 
 
Police killings have raised unique concerns following widely-
publicized, controversial police shootings of Black children, females, and 
males.40  Police officers kill Blacks at rates more than twice those of whites.41  
Particularly, a white male police officer is most likely to fatally shoot a 
person who is a young Black male.42 
Police killings of Blacks reflect two problems: one is systemic racism 
and the other is the police policy that authorizes police officers to use lethal 
force.  We begin with an analysis of the policies that license police officers 
to kill. 
We start with detailed statistics of police killings in general.  In the 
United States, officers kill people in many ways,43 most commonly by 
shooting.44  In 2019 alone, police officers fatally shot over one thousand 
                                                 
 40. See, e.g., Mic, 23 Ways You Could Be Killed If You Are Black in America, YOUTUBE 
(July 13, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_VaNhI4CLo (showing video of the 
faces of many Black victims of police shootings and celebrities calling for change); Brittany 
Spanos, Beyoncé, Rihanna, Alicia Keys: How to Get Killed While Black, ROLLING STONE (July 
13, 2016, 9:22 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/beyonce-rihanna-
alicia-keys-how-to-get-killed-while-black-81976/ (showing video of the faces of many Black 
victims of police shootings and celebrities calling for change); see also Timothy Williams, 
Study Supports Suspicion That Police Are More Likely to Use Force on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/study-supports-suspicion-that-police-
use-of-force-is-more-likely-for-blacks.html?_r=0. 
 41. See The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, THE GUARDIAN, https://www. 
theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2019) (noting the rate of death for young Black men was five times 
higher than white men of the same age, out of the 1,146 people killed by police in 2015); Law 
Enforcement and Violence: The Divide Between Black and White Americans, ASSOC. PRESS-
NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS RES., http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML% 
20Reports/law-enforcement-and-violence-the-divide-between-black-and-white-americans08 
03-9759.aspx.  
 42. See Ryan Gabrielson et al., Deadly Force, in Black and White: A ProPublica 
Analysis of Killings by Police Shows Outsize Risk for Young Black Males, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 
10, 2014, 11:07 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-and-white; 
David Johnson et al., Officer Characteristics and Racial Disparities in Fatal Officer-Involved 
Shootings, 116 PNAS (July 22, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1903856116 (last updated 
Aug. 6, 2019). 
 43. See supra note 20 (listing the various types of lethal force). See also 
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org (providing an Excel database of the forms of officer caused 
death, the majority of which are from gun violence). 
 44. See The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, THE GUARDIAN, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killin 
gs-us-database (last visited Apr. 23, 2019). 
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people.45  By comparison, police officers have fatally shot more people in 
the last eighteen months than the total number of people that the States have 
executed for capital punishment in the last forty-four years.46  This startling 
fact demands that we examine the constitutionality of police killings and 
whether the police use of lethal force passes constitutional scrutiny. 
Police policies direct police officers to use deadly force, but only as a 
last resort.47  Specifically, officers are guided by their individual departments 
and are expected to use only the amount of force necessary to mitigate an 
incident, make an arrest, or protect themselves or others from harm.48  Police 
use of force should include base levels of verbal and physical restraint, non-
lethal force, and lethal force;49 yet, instead, they are permitted and trained to 
                                                 
 45. Fatal Force, See 1,004 People Have Been Shot and Killed by Police in the Past Year, 
WASH. POST (July 16, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/ 
police-shootings-database/. 
 46. Executions Overview, Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR. (2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/number-of-
executions-by-state-and-region-since-1976 (documenting that from 1976 to June 2020, there 
were 1,518 executions, of which 1,338 were by lethal injection, 163 by electrocution, 11 by 
gas inhalation, 3 by hanging, and 3 by firing squad).  The number of annual police killings 
has been consistent over the last several years and is usually high compared to other countries.  
See Rob Picheta et al., American Police Shoot, Kill and Imprison More People Than Other 
Developed Countries. Here’s the Data, CNN (June 8, 2020, 7:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2020/06/08/us/us-police-floyd-protests-country-comparisons-intl/index.html.  
 47. See WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DEADLY FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 
AMNESTY INT’L (2015), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/aiusa_ 
deadlyforcereportjune2015-1.pdf (presenting a state-by-state legislative survey on police use 
of lethal force statutes in the United States and noting that U.S. law does not comply with 
international standards which limit police use of lethal force to instances necessary to protect 
against the threat of death or serious injury); see, e.g., Chicago Police Department General 
Order G03-02, Use of Force (Issue Date: Feb. 28, 2020, Effective Date: Feb. 29, 2020), 
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8fff-44306f3da 
7b28a19.pdf?hl=true.  See also Libor Jany, Minneapolis Police Reveal Changes to Use-of-
Force Policy, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2016, 9:40 AM), http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-
police-reveal-changes-to-use-of-force-policy/389509371/.  Further, several States allow 
police officers to kill a person who is attempting to escape from a prison or jail.  See infra 
Part III, A, 2, discussing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (stating that deadly force 
can be used to prevent escape if “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect 
poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers or others”). 
Additionally, many such States allow private citizens to use lethal force if they are carrying 
out law enforcement activities.  See generally Frances Robles, The Citizen’s Arrest Law Cited 
in Arbery’s Killing Dates Back to the Civil War, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2020), https://www. 
nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arbery-citizen-arrest-law-georgia.html (discussing Georgia’s 
citizen’s arrest law that arose in 1863). 
 48. See Chicago Police Department General Order G03-02, supra note 46.  See, Jany, 
supra note 46.  
 49. See, e.g., Policy on Use of Lethal Force, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-the-fbis-policy-on-the-use-of-deadly-force-by-its-
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use deadly or lethal force, including shooting and chokeholds, under said 
“justifiable” circumstances.50  Moreover, regardless of the official or 
unofficial restrictions and controversies on the use of lethal force, a police 
officer might and, often times does, violate those limitations.51  To this day, 
there are no methods to objectively control police brutality. 
Additionally, those lethal force policies are rationalized by the danger 
narrative: the inherent dangers that police officers face while policing.52  
However, this narrative has been debunked,53 as very few police officers die 
in the line of duty.54  For example, in 2019, eighty-nine police officers died 
in the line of duty, forty-eight officers of which died as a result of felonious 
                                                 
special-agents (last visited Sept. 6, 2020) (“FBI special agents may use deadly force only 
when necessary—when the agent has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses 
an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the agent or another person.  If 
feasible, a verbal warning to submit to the authority of the special agent is given prior to the 
use of deadly force”). 
 50.  See Overview of Police Use of Force, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/overview-police-use-force (reporting that [t]he International 
Association of Chiefs of Police has described use of force as the “amount of effort required 
by police to compel compliance by an unwilling subject”).  “Justifiable” circumstances exist 
when the officer reasonably believes the subject poses a significant threat of serious bodily 
injury or death to themselves or others.  Lethal force is judged by an objective reasonableness 
standard—not subjective as to what the officer’s intent might have been, and, therefore, must 
be judged from the perspective of a “reasonable police officer at the scene.” See Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), discussed in Part III, A (reporting that [t]he International 
Association of Chiefs of Police has described use of force as the “amount of effort required 
by police to compel compliance by an unwilling subject”). 
 51. See Bill Hutchinson, Atlanta Police Use-of-Force Policy Violated Multiple Times in 
Fatal Shooting of Rayshard Brooks: Prosecutor, ABC NEWS (June 18, 2020, 4:21 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/atlanta-police-force-policy-violated-multiple-times-fatal/story? 
id=71295429/.  Following the George Floyd and Rayshard Brooks killings, some 
municipalities are reassessing their use of force policies.  See, e.g., Atlanta Mayor Orders 
Changes to Police Use-of-Force Policy, Calls Rayshard Brooks Shooting “Murder”, CBS 
NEWS (June 16, 2020, 8:38 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/atlanta-mayor-keisha-
bottoms-police-force-policy-rayshard-brooks-shooting/. 
 52. See Ivana Dukanovic, Note, Reforming High-Stakes Police Departments: How 
Federal Civil Rights Will Rebuild Constitutional Policing in America, 43 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 911, 913 (2016). 
 53. See Jordan B. Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops, 117 
MICH. L. REV. 635 (2019) (analyzing a comprehensive data set of thousands of traffic stops 
that resulted in violence against officers across more than two hundred law enforcement 
agencies in Florida over a 10-year period and finding that “violence against officers was rare 
and that incidents that do involve violence are typically low risk and do not involve 
weapons”). 
 54. See FBI Releases 2019 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of 
Duty, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 4, 2020),  https://www.fbi.gov/news/ 
pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2019-statistics-on-law-enforcement-officers-killed-in-th 
e-line-of-duty. 
BLACK LIVES MATTER: BANNING POLICE LYNCHINGS 
Fall 2020 BLACK LIVES MATTER 13 
acts, forty-four of whom were killed by firearms.55  Despite the low risk of 
being killed by civilians, police officers are still licensed to kill, pursuant to 
and restricted by official police policies.56 
Further, many other controversial, yet legal, tactics are used to perform 
the policing function, often resulting in police brutality.  Many of those are 
abusively used against Blacks, including use of “nonlethal” weapons,57 no-
knock warrants,58 racial profiling,59 bench warrants following default 
judgments,60 and stop and frisk.61 
                                                 
 55. See, FBI Releases 2019 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of 
Duty, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 4, 2020),  https://www.fbi.gov/news/ 
pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2019-statistics-on-law-enforcement-officers-killed-in-th 
e-line-of-duty. 
 56. See supra note 46. 
 57. Police officers are legally permitted to use “nonlethal” (but often deadly) weapons, 
including rubber bullets, tear gas, flash-bangs, beanbag rounds, Tasers, and attack dogs, as 
evidenced by their use during the recent Black Lives protests, sometimes causing serious, even 
fatal, injuries.  Pepper spray is an example of nonlethal force, which along with other forms of 
non-lethal force can cause serious bodily harm.  See Amy McKeever, From Tear Gas to Rubber 
Bullets, Here’s What ‘Nonlethal’ Weapons Can Do to the Body, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 
2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/06/what-nonle thal-weapons-can-do-
to-the-body-george-floyd/; see Sgt. Tracee L. Jackson Non-Lethal Packs a Punch, JOINT 
INTERMEDIATE FORCE CAPABILITIES OFFICE (Aug. 12, 2006), https:// jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-
Room/In-The-News/Article/577845/non-lethal-packs-a-punch/ (stating “a weapon is considered 
non-lethal because it does not produce penetrating trauma.  If it doesn’t go into an individual’s 
skin, it’s called non-lethal.  However, many weapons used may produce lethal results if 
employed in a different manner.  The terminology better suited to this array of gadgets is ‘less 
than lethal’”).  For a detailed recounting of all “less-lethal” weapons that law enforcement is 
allowed to use, see Alyssa Fowers et al., A Guide to the Less-Lethal Weapons That Law 
Enforcement Uses Against Protestors, WASH. POST (June 5, 2020), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/05/less-lethal-weapons-protests/?arc404=true. 
 58. A judge may issue a no-knock warrant that allows police officers to enter a property 
without immediate prior notification of the residents, such as by knocking or ringing a 
doorbell. See generally Peter G. Berris et al., “No Knock” Warrants and Other Law 
Enforcement Identification Considerations, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (2020), https://crsre 
ports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10499. 
 59. Police use “racial profiling” when suspecting or targeting a person on the basis of 
assumed characteristics or behavior of a racial group, rather than on individual suspicion.  See 
Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence, 51 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 167–73 (2016) (identifying racial profiling as a factor in police 
shootings).  
 60. A judge may issue a bench warrant, which authorizes police to arrest a person 
charged with some contempt, crime, or misdemeanor.  See, e.g., Richard A. Webster, One in 
7 Adults in New Orleans Have a Warrant Out for Their Arrest, New Data Shows, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 20, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/one-in-7-adults-in-
new-orleans-have-a-warrant-out-for-their-arrest-new-data-shows/2019/09/20/db85a5c8-da3 
d-11e9-a688-303693fb4b0b_story.html. 
 61. Police are allowed to stop and frisk, a controversial practice, allowing police to 
temporarily detain, question, search people for drugs, weapons, and contraband.  See L. Song 
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The use of deadly force and other “nonlethal” tactics has become more 
pervasive, as the criminalization of petty crimes has increased law 
enforcement’s intrusion into our everyday lives,62 leading to over-policing63 
and the militarization of the police.64  This is especially true in relation to the 
War on Drugs (the “WOD”),65 which has increased searches66 and arrests,67 
with a disproportionate impact on the Black community.68  As a result of the 
                                                 
Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1144–46 (2012) 
(identifying a reasonableness problem in the low hit rates of stop-and-frisks and the judgment 
of suspiciousness). 
 62. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 
1062 (2015). 
 63. Jonathan Blanks, The War on Drugs Has Made Policing More Violent: What Can be 
Done to Curb the Excessive and, Sometimes, Predatory Policing that Has Emerged from the 
Drug War?, DEMOCRACY: J. OF IDEAS (July 19, 2016), https://democracyjournal. 
org/arguments/the-war-on-drugs-has-made-policing-more-violent/  (last visited July 22, 
2019) (noting that “[p]olice are incentivized to initiate unnecessary contact with pedestrians 
and motorists, and they do so most often against ethnic and racial minorities. Such over-
policing engenders resentment among minority communities and jeopardizes public safety”). 
 64. See, e.g., RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF 
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013) (arguing that militarization has produced police forces 
inconsistent with the principles of a free society); see also WHO DO YOU SERVE, WHO DO 
YOU PROTECT? POLICE VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (Maya Schenwar et 
al. eds. 2016) (exploring alternatives to the police for keeping communities safe); Mary D. 
Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence, 90 IND. 
L.J. 151 (2015). 
 65. “War on Drugs,” for purposes of this Article, refers to the politically-motivated legal 
and extra-legal campaign to discourage the production, distribution, and consumption 
of psychoactive drugs, particularly marijuana.  See generally Scott C. Martin, A Brief History 
of Marijuana Law in the United States, TIME (Apr. 20, 2016), http://time.com/4298038/ 
marijuana-history-in-america/; Mitchell F. Crusto, Weeding Out Injustice: Amnesty for Pot 
Offenders, 47 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 367 (2020). 
 66. While the Fourth Amendment states “the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, paper and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,” there is little 
doubt that WOD policy has whittled away significantly at that protection.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV.  See, e.g., Radley Balko, The Drug War Exception for the Fourth Amendment, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2014 1:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/ 
wp/2014/03/31/the-drug-war-exception-to-the-fourth-amendment/; Conor Friedersdorf, 
Thurgood Marshall’s Prescient Warning: Don’t Gut the 4th Amendment, THE ATLANTIC (July 
10, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/07/thurgood-marshalls-presci 
ent-warning-dont-gut-the-4th-amendment/277657/. 
 67. For example, about twenty percent, or about four hundred thousand of those 
incarcerated, are imprisoned for marijuana-related offenses.  See Drug War Statistics, DRUG 
POLICY ALLIANCE https://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/drug-war-statistics (last visited Aug. 
31, 2020) (noting that the U.S. spends over fifty billion dollars on the war on drugs, annually, 
with over six hundred thousand arrested in 2016 for marijuana law violations, of which eighty-
nine percent were only for possession). 
 68. April M. Short, Michelle Alexander: White Men Get Rich from Legal Pot, Black Men 
Stay in Prison, ALTERNET (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.alternet.org/drugs/michelle-
alexander-white-men-get-rich-legal-pot-black-men-stay-prison (calling for reparations for 
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WOD, every person in America is a suspect, and Blacks, in particular, are 
presumed guilty until proven innocent.69 
In summary, the highly publicized, questionable police killings and the 
subsequent exoneration of the offending officers has heightened a centuries-
old-call for an end to police brutality against Blacks.70  That rallying call will 
be forever remembered, although one wonders whether it will produce real 
change. 
 
B. The Movement 
 
The Black Lives Matter Movement is an international movement 
against systemic racism and police brutality.  It started in protest to the 
February 26, 2012, killing of Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year-old Black 
male, by George Zimmerman, a white male and self-appointed 
“neighborhood watch coordinator.”71  Martin’s death prompted rallies, 
marches, and protests across the nation,72 including an online petition calling 
for a full investigation and prosecution of Zimmerman that received 2.2 
                                                 
the war on drugs, as the WOD has decimated families, spread despair and hopelessness 
through entire communities). 
 69. See Drug War Statistics, supra note 66 (“In the 39 states for which we have sufficient 
police data, Black adults were more than four times as likely to be arrested for marijuana 
possession as white adults.” (footnotes omitted.)).  See also Report: The War on Marijuana 
in Black and White, AM. C.L. UNION, (June 2013), https://www.aclu.org/ 
sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf (last visited July 22, 2019); 
Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on 
Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 391 (2002). 
 70. See e.g., Katie Nodjimbadem, The Long, Painful History of Police Brutality in the 
U.S., THE SMITHSONIAN (July 27, 2017) https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-
institution/long-painful-history-police-brutality-in-the-us-180964098/ (updated May 29, 
2020); H. Bruce Pierce, Blacks and Law Enforcement: Towards Police Brutality Reduction, 
17 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 3 (1986); Police Violence Against Afro-Descendants in the United 
States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rep. No. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. doc. 156 (2018), http://www.oas. 
org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/PoliceUseOfForceAfrosUSA.pdf. 
 71. Greg Botelho, What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN (May 23, 2012, 
10:48 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/in 
dex.html (Martin was returning home to a condominium owned by his father’s fiancé, after 
buying a can of Arizona Iced Tea and a pack of Skittles, in Sanford, Florida.  Zimmerman 
saw the teenager and reported him to the Sanford Police as “suspicious” and several minutes 
later, fatally shot the Black teenager in the chest.). 
 72. Karen Grigsby Bates, A Look Back at Trayvon Martin’s Death and the Movement It 
Inspired, NPR (July 31, 2018, 7:34 AM) https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2018/07/ 
31/631897758/a-look-back-at-trayvon-martins-death-and-the-movement-it-inspired; Matt 
Williams et al., Trayvon Martin Protests Being Held in More than 100 US Cities, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 20, 2013, 10:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/20/tray 
von-martin-protests-us-cities. 
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million signatures.73  After national media focused on the incident, 
Zimmerman was eventually charged and tried, but a jury acquitted him of 
second-degree murder and manslaughter in July 2013.74  In response to the 
acquittal of George Zimmerman, the Movement began with the use of the 
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter on social media.75 
Then, the Movement received national attention following the police 
shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.76  On August 9, 2014, 
Michael Brown, Jr., an eighteen-year-old Black male, was fatally shot by a 
white male Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson.77  This incident ignited 
one of the first in-person public protests of the Movement, at a St. Louis 
mall, utilizing the slogan “Hands up, don’t shoot.”78 
Over five years later, the death of George Floyd by a police chokehold 
reignited the Movement, bringing broad national79 and international 
attention80 to racial inequity in this country.81  Throughout its history, the 
Movement demanded police reform, particularly, as it relates to brutality 
                                                 
 73. Tracy Martin & Sybrina Fulton, Prosecute the Killer of Our Son, 17-Year-Old 
Trayvon Martin (Apr. 11, 2012), https://www.change.org/p/prosecute-the-killer-of-our-son-
17-year-old-trayvon-martin. 
 74. Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimm erman-
verdict-trayvon-martin.html. 
 75. See Garza, supra note 15.  
 76. Larry Buchanan et al., Q&A What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-
siege-after-police-shooting.html?_r=0. 
 77. Eliot C. McLaughlin, What We Know About Michael Brown’s Shooting, CNN (Aug. 
15, 2014, 12:10 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/us/missouri-ferguson-michael-
brown-what-we-know/index.html.  
 78. Nicholas Cannariato, ‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot’ Examines What Led To Ferguson and 
Baltimore Protests, NPR (Aug. 1 2019, 1:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/01/7454 
84653/hands-up-don-t-shoot. Despite the protest, on November 24, 2014, the local prosecutor 
announced the St. Louis County grand jury decided not to indict Officer Wilson, which 
resulted in more protests, injuries, and property damage.  In March 2015, the U.S. Department 
of Justice concluded that Wilson shot Brown in self-defense, while also finding systemic 
discrimination against Blacks by the Ferguson Police Department and municipal court. 
 79. See We Demand National Change to Protect Citizens and Communities from Police 
Violence and Misconduct, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/u-s-senate-we-demand-
national-change-to-protect-citizens-and-communities-from-police-violence-and-misconduct 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2019) (online petition). 
 80. See Arian Campo-Flores & Joshua Jamerson, Black Lives Matter’s Years of Pressure 
Paved Way for Sudden Police Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2020), https://www. 
wsj.com/articles/black-lives-matters-years-of-pressure-paved-way-for-sudden-police-overha 
ul-11592516422; Spencer Bokat-Lindell, Why Is Police Brutality Still Happening?, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/opinion/minneapolis-police-
brutality.html. 
 81. See, e.g., U.S. Must Take ‘Serious Action’ to Half Police Killings of Unarmed African 
Americans, U.N. NEWS (May 28, 2020) https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/ 1065042. 
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against Blacks.82  In distinguishing Black victims of such brutality, the 
Movement highlights how Blacks are the victims of State-sponsored 
violence:  
 
Black Lives Matter is a unique contribution that goes beyond 
extrajudicial killings of Black people by police and vigilantes . . .  
When we say Black Lives Matter, we are talking about the ways in 
which Black people are deprived of our basic human rights and 
dignity. It is an acknowledgement [that] Black poverty and 
genocide is state violence . . .  And the fact is that the lives of Black 
people—not ALL people—exist within these conditions is [a] 
consequence of state violence.83 
 
Hence, the Movement is about social injustice, equal protection under 
the law, and, most importantly, the need to redress State-sponsored racial 
oppression of Blacks.84  Consequently, Black Lives Matter is one of the most 
significant social movements in recent history.85 
Analytically, to date, the Movement has produced some positive results 
in achieving two major objectives, (1) bringing attention to police brutality 
against Blacks and (2) seeking change in systemic racism.86  Most 
importantly, it has awakened a moral conscience to redress systemic 
                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Garza, supra note 15. 
 84. See Rana Foroohar, Black Lives Matter Is About Both Race and Class, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (June 14, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/28dc48f8-b36b-4848-8e73-774999a 
8e502 (discussing the intersections of racism and capitalism as they pertain exploitation of 
labor, specifically Black labor); Jon Schwarz, Black Lives Matter Wants to End Police 
Brutality. History Suggests It Will Go Much Further, THE INTERCEPT (June 27, 2020, 5:00 
AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/06/27/black-lives-matter-police-brutality-history/ (discussing 
the broad concept of redirection of public money from policing to health care, housing, 
schools and jobs that the Movement has put to the table thus far). 
 85. See Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be The Largest Movement in U.S. 
History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020),  https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/ 
us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html (noting that, based on recent polling, about fifteen 
million to twenty-six million people in the United States have participated in demonstrations 
over the death of George Floyd and others in recent weeks).  For a visual representation of 
the movement worldwide, see Black Lives Matter Protests 2020, https://www.creosote 
maps.com/blm2020/ (last updated Sept. 3, 2020). 
 86. See infra Part III, B. 
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racism,87 including a renewed call for reparations.88  Overall, the Movement 
has brought attention to important conversations and fostered a spirit of equal 
justice for every American, particularly relating to police accountability.89 
Unfortunately, the Movement has yet to achieve a real change in 
policing.90 Many of the proposed reforms have transformative potential, such 
as the re-imagining of policing;91 however, some of the changes have 
                                                 
 87. See James Lartey, Oppression America: ‘To Root This Out We Need a Movement 
Against Racist Policies, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2018 6:00 PM), https://www.theguard 
ian.com/us-news/2018/jun/06/everyday-racism-in-america-how-to-fix-it; Justin Worland, 
America’s Long Overdue Awakening to Systemic Racism, TIME (June 11, 2020, 6:41 AM), 
https://time.com/5851855/systemic-racism-america/; Washington Post Staff, Resources to 
Understand America’s Long History of Injustice and Inequality, WASH. POST (June 26, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/08/understanding-racism-inequality-amer 
ica/?arc404=true. 
 88. The discussion around the case for reparations owes a great service to Ta-Neishi 
Coates’ thorough and thoughtful piece in The Atlantic from 2014, without which the case for 
reparations would be unlikely to have gained the momentum and traction that it now has.  See 
Ta-Neishi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/; see also, Nikole 
Hannah-Jones, What is Owed, N.Y. TIMES MAG., (June 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2020/06/24/magazine/reparations-slavery.html; Patricia Cohen, What Reparations 
for Slavery Might Look Like in 2019, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/05/23/business/economy/reparations-slavery.html; Thai Jones, Slavery Reparations 
Seem Impossible. In Many Places They’re Already Happening, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/31/slavery-reparations-seem-impossible-
many-places-theyre-already-happening/?arc404=true; Seth Cohen, An Overdue Debt-Why 
It’s Finally Time to Pay Reparations to Black Americans, FORBES (June 21, 2020, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sethcohen/2020/06/21/its-finally-time-to-pay-black-america 
ns-reparations/#472a85b65cb5; Emma Goldberg, How Reparations for Slavery Became a 
2020 Campaign Issue, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/us/ 
politics/reparations-slavery.html (updated June 24, 2020). 
 89. See generally Monu Bedi, The Asymmetry of Crimes by and Against Police Officers, 
66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 79 (2017) (recommending that “[s]tates should care equally about harms 
by and against police officers and their impact on state activity”). 
 90. See generally President’s Trump’s Executive Order on Safe Policing (June 16, 
2020); https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-safe-policing-safe-
communities/.  There has also been stalled legislation.  See Catie Edmonson, Democrats 
Unveil Sweeping Bill Targeting Police Misconduct and Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/us/politics/democrats-police-misconduct-bill-protes 
ts.html (June 23, 2020); Sara Ferris et al., House Passes Seeping Police Reform Bill, POLITCO, 
(June 25, 2020, 8:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/25/police-reform-plan-
house-339691; E. Greve, Democrats Block ‘Empty’ Republican Police Reform Bill, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/24/congress-
police-reform-republican-bill-democrats; Niv Elis, House Democrats Include $597 Million 
for Police Reform in Spending Bill, THE HILL (July 7, 2020 10:11 AM), https://thehill.com/ 
policy/finance/506152-house-democrats-propose-597-million-toward-police-reform. 
 91. See, e.g., Tom Jackman, African American Mayors Lay Out Plan for Police Reform 
Without ‘Defunding’, WASH. POST (July 27, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washington 
post.com/crime-law/2020/07/27/african-american-mayors-lay-out-plan-police-reform-witho 
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remained symbolic, such as the taking down of controversial monuments, 
particularly those dedicated to Confederate generals.92 
The movement has not ended police killings of Blacks nor has it 
produced convictions of police officers who use deadly force.93  That is 
because, when it comes to stopping police officers from killing Blacks, the 
Movement faces formidable legal and policy obstacles, which will be 




When it comes to the issue of police use of lethal force against Blacks, 
the Movement faces a conundrum—that the legal system and policing 
culture unintentionally condone the killings of Blacks by white police 
officers.94  This contention is supported by statistical evidence and a case 
study of an eleven year investigation and prosecution of a mass shooting of 
Black people by a band of white police officers, in the Katrina Massacre.95  
The next section has two parts: (1) it introduces the concepts of the Blue 
Shield and the Blue Code and argues that those combine to protect police 
officers from criminal liability when they use deadly force, and (2) it presents 
                                                 
ut-defunding/; Kristina Sgueglia et al., New York Police Department’s Budget Has Been 
Slashed by $1 Billion, CNN (July 1, 2020, 4:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/01/us/ 
new-york-budget-nypd-1-billion-cut-trnd/index.html; Vannessa Romo, Minneapolis Council 
Moves to Defund Police, Establish ‘Holistic’ Public Safety Force, NPR (June 26, 2020, 8:14 
P.M.), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/06/26/8841 
49659/minneapolis-council-moves-to-defund-police-establish-holistic-public-safety-forc; 
David Zahsner et al., Los Angeles Cut LAPD Spending, Taking Police Staffing to its Lowest 
Level in 12 Years, L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-
07-01/lapd-budget-cuts-protesters-police-brutality. 
 92. See Robert Draper, Toppling Statues Is a First Step Toward Ending Confederate 
Myths, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 2, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/ 
2020/07/toppling-statues-is-first-step-toward-ending-confederate-myths/; Alisha Ebrahimji 
et al., Confederate Statutes Are Coming Down Following George Floyd’s Death.  Here’s 
What to Know, CNN (July 1, 2020 3:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/09/us/confedera 
te-statues-removed-george-floyd-trnd/index.html; Colleen Walsh, Must We Allow Symbols of 
Racism on Public Land, THE HARVARD GAZETTE (June 19, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/ 
gazette/story/2020/06/historian-puts-the-push-to-remove-confederate-statues-in-context//. 
 93. See infra, Part I, A. 
 94. This Article refers to this problem as the “Black Lives Matter Conundrum.”  See, 
e.g., Jamiles Lartey, Why It’s Not So Simple to Arrest The Cops Who Shot Breonna Taylor: 
Memes and Billboards Are Calling for Arresting the Three Officers. But What Does Kentucky 
Law Say?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 8, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproj 
ect.org/2020/08/08/why-it-s-not-so-simple-to-arrest-the-cops-who-shot-breonna-taylor. See 
generally FINAL REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1 
(2015), http://elearning-courses.net/iacp/html/webinarResources/170926/FinalReport21stC 
enturyPolicing.pdf.  
 95. See infra Part I, C, 2. 
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the lessons from the Katrina Massacre, which shows how those concepts 




In order for the Movement, and society,96 to succeed in saving Black 
lives, one must understand the systemic ways in which the law protects white 
police officers who kill Blacks.  This preferential treatment is referred to as 
unequal justice.97 
There are unequal, hyper-protective rights and privileges that protect 
officers from criminal liability.  The first is the “Blue Shield”98— the legal 
rules and doctrines that promote and condone the police use of lethal force.99  
The second is the “Blue Code”100—a system and culture that protects police 
officers from personal and criminal liability and supports systemic racism.101 
In addition to these extralegal protections, relative to criminal liability, 
every police officer enjoys all the constitutional and State-based legal 
protections that each person enjoys.  Those include the right to due 
process,102 the presumption of innocence,103 the State’s burden to prove the 
                                                 
 96. Sadly, to date, the legal system, including policymakers, academics, bar associations, 
legislators, police associations, and the like, have not taken responsibility for reforming a legal 
system that promotes and condones police killings of Blacks. 
 97. “Unequal justice,” for the purpose of this Article, refers to the preferential body of 
rules to judge the criminal liability of police officers for killing people, which differs, 
unequally, from the rules used to judge other members of the public. 
 98. “Blue Shield,” for purposes of this Article, is defined as a combination of Supreme 
Court judicial doctrines that serve to shield police officers from personal, criminal liability, 
for harm done during the course of policing.  See also Linda Sheryl Greene, Before and After 
Michael Brown—Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 1, 4 (2015) (“[I]ndividual instances of police deadly force against unarmed Black men 
are enabled by a legal jurisprudence of structural violence which provides no accountability 
for the societal marginalization and stigmatization of young Black men”). 
 99. See infra Part III, A. 
 100. “Blue Code,” for purposes of this Article, is defines as a system of police culture, 
local practices, and racism that serves as an additional layer of protection, by which police 
offices avoid criminal liability.  See infra Part III, B. 
 101. See infra Part III, B. 
 102. See infra Part III, B. 
 103. In criminal prosecutions, a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. See 
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 460 (1895) (establishing the presumption of innocence 
of persons accused of crimes).  This means the State has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the alleged committed the crime. 
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elements of the charge of criminality,104 the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard,105 mens rea,106 and other legal defenses.107  
Those normal protections, combined with the hyper-protections of the 
Blue Shield and the Blue Code, make it nearly impossible to prosecute and 
convict a white male police officer for killing a Black person.108  Statistics 
report that while police officers fatally shot over one thousand people each 
year over a ten-year period, only fifty-four officers were charged with a 
crime during that same period.109  In the exceptional instance where an 
                                                 
 104. To convict, the State must have the evidence necessary to convince a jury that the 
accused is guilty of the charges, beyond a reasonable doubt.  In the case of George Floyd, the 
evidence of the killing seems clear: the police officer kneeled on the victim’s neck.  Yet, there 
is a dispute over whether that heinous act was the actual cause of Mr. Floyd’s death.  There 
are competing coroner reports on the cause of death and how Mr. Floyd’s existing medical 
condition may have contributed to his death.  See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Independent 
Autopsy of George Floyd Contradicts Official Report, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2020), https:// 
www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-06-01/george-floyd-independent-autopsy-asphyxia. 
 105. The State has the duty to prove its case of criminality beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 460.  This requires the prosecutor to establish sufficient proof or 
evidence to charge a police officer.  Id.  This varies from State to State, with each crime 
requiring differing requirements of proof.  For example, as it is very difficult to prove first-
degree murder charges, police officers, such as those in the George Floyd case are seldom, if 
ever, charged with first-degree murder.  See Ian Millhiser, The Charges Against Former 
Minnesota Police Officer Derek Chauvin, Explained, VOX (June 1, 2020, 2:30 PM), https:// 
www.vox.com/2020/6/1/21276936/derek-chauvin-charges-third-degree-murder-explained-
george-floyd. 
 106. To convict, the State must prove the required mens rea, that is, that the accused had 
the intent or knowledge of the wrong for which he or she is charged. See generally PAUL H. 
ROBINSON ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES (4th ed. 2017). 
Sometimes, intent can be negated by certain defenses such as the plea of insanity.  See Stephen 
J. Morse et al., The Uneasy Entente Between Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona 
97 NORTHWESTERN J. CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 1071 (2007).  
 107. There are many other legal defenses to homicide charges.  For example, self-defense 
statutes provide an affirmative defense to the justifiable use of deadly force.107  See, e.g., 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (providing that a person is free to use lethal force if that person 
reasonably believes that using such force is necessary to prevent imminent danger or great 
bodily harm to that person or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible 
felony).  See Morse, supra 105. 
 108. However, these hyper-protections failed to protect a Black police officer from 
prosecution and conviction, for killing a white woman, while policing.  One example is the 
case of Mohamed Noor, who is a Black, Somali-American, Muslim police officer who fatally 
shot Justine Ruszczyk (Damond), a white, Australian woman, in Minnesota on July 15, 2017.  
And then was convicted for the homicide and sentence to twelve and a half years in prison.  
See John Eligon, A Black Officer, a White Woman, A Rare Murder Conviction. Is It 
‘Hypocrisy,’ or Justice?, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/ 
us/mohamed-noor-guilty.html (reporting also that the victim’s family received an 
unprecedented $20 million settlement). 
 109. See Kimberly Kindy et al., Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-fe w-
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officer was charged in a deadly shooting, there were “high profile” factors 
such as a victim shot in the back, a video recording of the incident, 
incriminating testimony from other officers, or allegations of a cover-up.110  
Further, the few police officers who were convicted or pled guilty to a fatal 
shooting received an average of four years of jail time, and sometimes only 
weeks.111 
In addition to the convincing statistical evidence, section two presents 
conclusive evidence that it is nearly impossible to convict a white police 
officer for killing a Black person.  This is the finding of a case study of the 
Katrina Massacre, where several white policemen were not convicted for 
fatally shooting two Blacks and maiming others,112even though the officers 
admitted the Blacks they shot were innocent victims, and that the crimes 
were committed without justification, willfully, and then covered up.113 
 
2. The Katrina Massacre 
 
In New Orleans, on August 30, 2005, Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge 
decimated the city’s flood level protection system,114 creating a humanitarian 
crisis.115  On Sunday, September 4, 2005, two Black families were struggling 
                                                 
prosecuted/; Matt Ferner et al., Here’s How Many Cops Got Convicted of Murder Last Year 
for On-Duty Shootings, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 13, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/entry/police-shooting-convictions_us_5695968ce4b086bc1cd5d0da.  
Parenthetically, many of these cases result in expensive settlements of wrongful death claims.  
See, e.g., Nick Wing, We Pay a Shocking Amount for Police Misconduct, and Cops Want Us 
to Accept It. We Shouldn’t, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2015, 7:39 AM), http://m. 
huffpost.com/us/entry/7423386. See, e.g., Eric Levenson, What Georgia Law Says About 
When Police Can Use Deadly Force, CNN (June 15, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://www. 
cnn.com/2020/06/15/us/rayshard-brooks-force-law/index.html (“From 2015 to 2020, police 
in Georgia have shot and killed 182 people, according to The Washington Post’s Fatal Force 
tracker.  In that time, only one Georgia officer has been charged with murder.”). 
 110. Id.  See also infra Part I, C. 
 111. See Kindy, supra note 108. 
112John Burnett, What Happened on New Orleans’ Danziger Bridge?, NPR (Sept. 13, 2016 
1:28 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6063982. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See generally LeevesOrg, The Katrina Myth; the Truth About a Thoroughly 
Unnatural Disaster, YOUTUBE (Aug. 30, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
wln_iq5bc8k&t=6s. 
 115. See generally HURRICANE KATRINA: AMERICA’S UNNATURAL DISASTER 186 (Jeremy 
I. Levitt & Matthew C. Whitaker eds. 2009); UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE NATION ON 
HURRICANE KATRINA (Betsy Reed ed. 2006) (viewing Katrina as “a social catastrophe directly 
caused by the government’s callous indifference to the needs of the region’s most vulnerable 
residents”). 
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to survive the floodwaters and chaotic conditions.116  On the same day, 
several white male New Orleans Police Department officers, in an unmarked 
rental truck, sped west down U.S. Highway 90, toward the Danziger 
Bridge.117  As the police officers approached, one of the families, the 
Bartholomews, started running up the bridge, in fear that criminals were 
shooting at them.118 
One officer then took out an assault rifle and open fired on all six 
fleeing, unarmed Blacks.119  More police officers continued driving toward 
the supposed suspects, while firing at them.120  The police officers’ bullets 
struck nearly every member of the Black family, leaving only one physically 
unharmed.121  Stunned, one of the victims, nineteen-year-old Jose Holmes, 
stopped to examine the wounds on his stomach.122  When the police officers 
reached him, they shot him two more times.123 
Meanwhile, on the west end of the bridge, other white male police 
officers saw two men running in a direction away from the police.124  At that 
point, one officer leaned out of the window of the moving car and fired a 
shotgun into the back of a Black male who was mentally-challenged, fatally 
wounding him.125  Another officer then got out of the police car and began 
to kick his dying body.126 
Sadly, two of the victims died on the Danziger Bridge that day.127  In 
addition, four other Black victims were maimed by police gunfire,128 
including a mother whose right arm was nearly shot off and had to be 
amputated.129  When the media first reported the Danziger Bridge shootings, 
                                                 
 116. See RONNIE GREENE, SHOTS ON THE BRIDGE: POLICE VIOLENCE AND COVER-UP IN THE 
WAKE OF KATRINA 20, 31–34 (2015). 
 117. Joe Rawley, Officer Who Initiated Danziger Call Testifies, WGNO (June 29, 2011, 
6:08 PM), http://wgno.com/2011/06/29/officer-who-initiated-danziger-call-testifies/. 
 118. See Burnett, supra note 111; LeevesOrg, supra note 113.  As noted, the police 
officers were in an unmarked rental van, with no distinguishing identification that they were 
police officers. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Laura Maggi et al., Judge in Danziger Case Sickened by “Raw Brutality of the 
Shooting and the Craven Lawlessness of the Cover-Up”, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 8, 2010), 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/04/judgesickenedbyrawbrutalit.html. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Burnett, supra note 111; LeevesOrg, supra note 113. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Burnett, supra note 111; LeevesOrg, supra note 113. 
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they celebrated the police officers as heroes who diligently protected the city 
from criminals.130 
Over the next eleven years, the federal government conducted an 
investigation and prosecuted the police officers for civil rights’ violations, 
after controversial local investigations and two failed prosecutions at the 
state level.131  During a federal trial, the police officers who fatally shot and 
maimed the Black families admitted that they had acted without justification 
and covered up their wrongdoings, including planting a gun and arresting an 
innocent victim.132  Despite this overwhelming evidence, the federal 
conviction was ultimately thrown out; yet, the officers served some prison 
time for lesser offenses, following the negotiation of a plea bargain.133 
The Katrina Massacre teaches the following valuable lessons: (1) police 
internal investigations of the use of lethal force incidents are unreliable and 
likely biased to protect fellow officers;134 (2) justice must be demanded and 
family members are the key to a successful prosecution;135 (3) local 
prosecutors and local judges are pro-police, showing unconscious racial 
bias;136 (4) an independent, federal investigation is needed to conduct a 
                                                 
 130. Christine Lagorio, Indicted N.O. Cops Greeted as “Heroes”, CBSNEWS (Jan. 3, 
2007, 5:55 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/indicted-no-cops-greeted-as-heroes/. 
 131. See United States v. Bowen, No. 10-20, 2010 WL 2771476 (E.D. La. July 12, 2010). 
 132. Laura Maggi, Police Supervisor Encouraged Cover-Up, Knew Officer Planted Gun 
While Still on Danziger Bridge, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Feb. 24, 2010), https://www.nola.com/ 
crime/index.ssf/2010/02/police_investigator_encouraged.html; Justin Elliott, New Orleans 
Cop Explains How Police Gunned Down Unarmed Civilians in Post-Katrina Incident, 
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 8, 2010, 5:47 AM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo. 
com/2010/04/new_orleans_cop_explains_how_police_gunned_down_ci.php. 
 133. After being found guilty, the Court threw out the conviction on a technicality.  The 
U.S. Attorney decided not to retry the case and to settle for a plea bargain.  See U.S. Attorney 
Kenneth A. Polite Delivers Remarks Following the Guilty Pleas and Sentencings of Five 
Former New Orleans Police Officers in the Danziger Bridge Shooting, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 
20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edla/pr/us-attorney-kenneth-polite-delivers-remar 
ks-following-guilty-pleas-and-sentencings-five. 
 134. Brendan McCarthy, Danziger Bridge Case Suggests Culture of Corruption at 
NOPD, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/ 
2010/03/danziger_bridge_details.html; Sarah Moughty, Former NOPD Officers Testify About 
“Secret Meeting” to Determine Danziger Bridge Cover-Up, PBS FRONTLINE (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/law-disorder/former-nopd-offic 
ers-testify-about-secret-meeting-to-determine-danziger-bridge-cover-up/. 
 135. See Paul Harris, Relatives Demand Justice as Police go on Trial over Katrina 
Killings, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2007, 9:23 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2007/mar/04/hurricanekatrina.usa. 
 136. See Charges Dismissed Against Police in Post-Katrina Shootings, CNN (Aug. 13, 
2008, 6:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/08/13/danziger.seven/; see also United 
States v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 n.3 (E.D. La. 2013) (“The primary basis for the 
dismissal of the indictment was the order of defendant Kenneth Bowen to give testimony, 
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proper gathering of the evidence and facts;137 (5) police officers lie, destroy 
evidence, and cover-up the facts;138 (6) charges of conspiracy to obstruct 
justice and misprision of a felony are effective means to discover the truth;139 
and (7) federal indictments and trials will not result in a homicide 
conviction,140 despite a finding of willful actions and admissions by the 
police and the imprisonment of an innocent person who the police 
wrongfully arrested and accused of shooting at them.141 
                                                 
over his assertion of his Constitutional rights, before the state grand jury on October 30, 2006, 
in exchange for immunity under La.C.Cr.P. Art. 439.1(C).”). 
 137. Feds Take Up Investigation of Cops in Post-Katrina Bridge Shooting Case, FOX 
NEWS (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.foxnews.com/story/feds-take-up-investigation-of-cops-
in-post-katrina-bridge-shooting-case; Brendan McCarthy, FBI Seizes Police Files in 
Danziger Bridge Shootings, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 7, 2009, 8:44 PM), http://www.nola.com/ 
crime/index.ssf/2009/08/fbi_seizes_police_files_in_bri.html. 
 138. See United States v. Lehrmann, No. 10-51, 2011 WL 4344582, at *1–*3 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 15, 2011); United States v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 612 (E.D. La. 2013). See also 
Ex-Police Officer Admits Role in Cover-Up of Louisiana Bridge Shooting, CNN (Mar. 11, 
2010, 1:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/03/11/nopd.shooting/index.html; Former 
Detective Describes Cover-Up, “Ham Sandwich”, PBS FRONTLINE (July 12, 2011), http:// 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/law-disorder/blog/2011/07/former-detective-describes-c 
over-up-ham-sandwich.html.  
 139. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fifth New Orleans Police Officer Pleads 
Guilty in Danziger Bridge Case (June 4, 2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/neworleans/ 
press-releases/2010/no060410.htm. 
 140. Subsequently, the rogue police officers were not prosecuted and did not serve time 
for the homicides, instead, they were permitted to plea bargain for lesser crimes and with 
reduced sentences.  On April 20, 2016, the U.S. Attorney announced that, under the terms of 
the deal, the police officers’ sentences would be dramatically reduced, with the four police 
officers who actually shot the civilians to serve sentences ranging from seven to twelve years 
in prison—a great reduction from the original sentences that were handed down in 2012 which 
had ranged from thirty-eight to sixty-five years imprisonment.  See U.S. Attorney Kenneth A. 
Polite Delivers Remarks Following the Guilty Pleas and Sentencings of Five Former New 
Orleans Police Officers in the Danziger Bridge Shooting, supra note 132; Ashley Fantz et al., 
Former New Orleans Officers Plead Guilty in Danziger Bridge Shootings, CNN (Apr. 21, 
2016, 8:25 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/04/20/us/new-orleans-danziger-bridge-plea-
deal/index.html. 
 141. On August 5, 2011, nearly six years after the shootings and three days of deliberation, 
the jury found each of the accused police officers guilty of all twenty-five counts, inclusive 
of depriving of civil rights, using firearms to shoot innocent people, conspiracy to obstruct 
justice, falsifying prosecution, planting a firearm, and making false statements to the FBI.  
United States v. Bowen, 799 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2015). However, on September 17, 2013, 
U.S. District Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt, in a 129-page ruling, threw out the convictions and 
granted a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct.  Order and Reasons, Bowen, 969 F. 
Supp. 2d at 612 (E.D. La. 2013).  That ruling was later affirmed by an en banc decision of the 
U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  On February 23, 2016, the district court reported that the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court decision to vacate the convictions and to order a new 
trial.  United States v. Bowen, 813 F.3d 600, 601 (5th Cir. 2016) (reporting a straw poll of the 
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In summary, the Katrina Massacre supports the proposition that the 
Blue Code and the Blue Shield make it nearly impossible to successfully 
prosecute a rogue police officer for the use of lethal force, even when they 
willfully kill people.  Further, the case study demonstrates that there needs 
to be a transformative change in the law. Such a solution must address the 
policies and practices of the use of deadly force, must be constitutionally 
mandated, and must dismantle the Blue Shield and the Blue Code.  That 
solution is presented next, in the form of a model code.142  
 
II. George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code 
 
The “George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code” (the “GFAC”) is the 
proposed solution to the Black Lives Matter Conundrum.  It reflects the 
normative claim that every person in this country has the constitutional right 
to be protected from police executions—without a conviction of a capital 
offense, without due process, and in an inhumane manner.143  Additionally, 
the Code provides for the absolute abolition of the police use of lethal force. 
The Code serves as a model for government officials and policymakers 
to achieve just police reform.144  The specific provisions of the GFAC follow 
the main text of this Article as Addendum I.  The three tenets reflected in the 
provisions of the GFAC are as follows. 
Tenet #1: The GFAC recognizes that there is a symbiotic relationship 
between the police and the community and that any solution to the Black 
Lives Matter Conundrum must comply with Dean Derrick Bell’s “interest-
convergence” principle.145   
                                                 
appellate court judges where seven judges voted for and seven judges voted against granting 
the portion for a new trial, with one abstention). 
 142. The use of a code instead of a statute is due to the recognition that a constitutionally 
mandated remedy reflects the victim’s right to protection against wrongful governmental 
infringement.  It applies broadly and to all levels and branches of government. 
 143. This rights-based approach to the application of capital punishment jurisprudence to 
lethal force killings is consistent with former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s vision of federalism, as a means to protect individuals from undue governmental 
intrusion.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (dissenting in a medical marijuana 
decision, stating “This case exemplifies the role of States as laboratories. The States’ core 
police powers have always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of their citizens”).  See generally Bradley W. Joondeph, The Deregulatory 
Valence of Justice O’Connor’s Federalism, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 507 (2008). 
 144. As the Fourteenth Amendment expressly grants Congress the authority to guarantee 
the effectiveness of the Amendment, Congress is authorized to enact the GFAC.  See U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 145. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education “and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma”, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“The interests of [B]lacks in achieving racial 
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites”). 
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Tenet #2: The GFAC seeks to identify a constitutionally based solution 
to the Conundrum, one that supports the fundamental rights of the victim; 
rather than one based on a privilege granted by the white power structure. 
Tenet #3: The GFAC’s primary goal is the end of police killings, by 
eliminating the policies, practices, and training that permit police officers to 
use lethal force, and by placing a special burden on the Federal Government 
to protect the constitutional rights of those victims and would-be victims.146 
In conclusion, the GFAC’s prohibition of the police use of lethal force 
constitutes a win-win, as it protects life and frees police officers from the 
duty to use lethal force.  This change will deliver both justice and peace.  Part 
III will argue why the GFAC is both constitutionally mandated and 
dismantles a feature of systemic racism.147 
 
III. Equal Justice 
 
Part III presents the constitutional and policy basis for the proposed 
George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code, concluding that the Code is mandated 
both by the Constitution and systemic racism.  First, it argues that the Court’s 
death penalty jurisprudence, which emphasizes the sanctity of life, is a 
superior approach to the constitutionality of lethal force compared to the 
Court’s current doctrines, which is focused on police officer liability, with 
                                                 
 146. See generally Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. La. 1964) 
(involving a civil rights criminal prosecution regarding segregation activities).  Judge John 
Minor Wisdom, dissenting, argues: “[T]he crowning glory of American federalism . . . is the 
protection the United States Constitution gives to the private citizen against all wrongful 
governmental invasion of fundamental rights and freedoms . . . it makes federalism 
workable.”  Id. at 570–71 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (footnotes and emphasis omitted); Monroe 
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (holding, inter alia, that a federal remedy exists for a 
violation of section 1983 even where a state remedy is available—that the intent of section 
1983 was for concurrent jurisdiction to exist and state remedies need not be exhausted first).  
See Part III for a brief response on the application of the abolition of lethal force and when, if 
ever, it might be permissible. 
 147. The GFAC also complies with international law.  See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46, 
at 13 (“In its [UN’s] General Comment 6 on the right to life under the Covenant, the 
Committee stated that ‘The deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a matter of the 
utmost gravity’ and that states must take measures to prevent arbitrary killing by their own 
security forces.  All states must ensure compliance with international law and standards 
including the United Nations Basic Principles on the use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials, Principle 9 of which states: ‘Law enforcement officials shall not use 
firearms against persons except in self-defense or defense of others against the imminent 
threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime 
involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their 
authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient 
to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made 
when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.’”). 
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reference to the Blue Shield.148  Second, it argues that the Code’s abolition 
of lethal force serves to dismantle a key feature of systemic racism, or the 
Blue Code,149 that subrogates Blacks and protects white male officers from 





As previously noted in Part I, and as illustrated in the Katrina Massacre, 
the Black Lives Matter Movement faces a conundrum. That is, despite the 
Constitution’s extensive provisions that protect the sanctity of life against 
wrongful Government infringement, police officers are permitted to and 
protected when they use deadly force. Overall, this section posits that the 
policies and the practice of police use of lethal force is an unconstitutional 
execution, which fails to comply with this Court’s death penalty jurisdiction.   
This analysis is presented as three subsections, (1) the constitutional 
protections of the sanctity of life against wrongful Government infringement 
and how particularly Black lives matter, (2) an analysis of Supreme Court 
decisions relative to the police use of deadly force, which effectuated the 
Blue Shield, and (3) an argument why police use of lethal force policies and 
practices are executions, in violation of the Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence, and, therefore, must be abolished. 
 
1. Black Lives Do Matter, Constitutionally and Statutorily 
 
This subsection begins with an examination of the Government’s taking 
of human life within the context of the Constitution.150  The Founders, in 
enacting the Constitution, recognized the sanctity of life.151  In addition to 
the explicit provisions in the Constitution protecting life from wrongful 
Government infringement, the Supreme Court has recognized the sanctity of 
life in several key cases.152  However, the Founders also adopted the then-
                                                 
 148. See supra note 97. 
 149. See supra note 99. 
 150. See generally THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST 
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION (Bernard 
Bailyn, ed., 1993). 
 151. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), http://www.arch 
ives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html (“We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).  
 152. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (where the Court held that the 
Constitution forbids the execution of the insane, it also expressly recognized the fundamental 
right to life, stating: “For today, no less than before, we may seriously question the retributive 
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accepted principle that the Government has the authority to end a human life, 
but only when subjected to strict limitations.153 
Specifically, when it came to the question of how the Government could 
take a life, the Founders provided utmost clarity with the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments, along with numerous due process protections against 
wrongful prosecutions.154  First, the Fifth guards against wrongful 
prosecutions of crimes, stating “No person shall . . . be deprived of life . . . 
without due process of law.”155  Then, with restrictions on punishment, 
comes the Eighth which prohibits  “cruel and unusual punishment.”156 
                                                 
value of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and 
stripped of his fundamental right to life.”  Id. at 409). 
 153. The Declaration of Independence reflected the common law of England, see 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 12930 (“The statute law of England does therefore 
very seldom, and the common law does never, inflict any punishment extending to life or 
limb, unless upon the highest necessity: and the constitution is an utter stranger to any 
arbitrary power of killing or maiming the subject without the express warrant of law . . . .  And 
it is enacted by the statute 5 Edw. III. c. 9. (that no man shall be forejudged of life or limb, 
contrary to the great charter and the law of the land: and again, by statute 28 Ed. III. c. 3. that 
no man shall be put to death, without being brought to answer by due process of law”).  Today, 
the death penalty is recognized as barbaric.  See generally Mythili Sampathkumar, UN 
Demands America End ‘Barbaric’ Use of Death Penalty, INDEPENDENT UK (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/death.-penalty-america-un-
demands-end-capital-punishment-a7993706.html. 
 154. (1) Article I, Section 9, prohibits the federal and state governments from passing bills 
of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. (2) Article I, Section 10, prohibits the federal and 
state governments from passing ex post facto laws.  Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. (3).  The Fifth 
Amendment expressly provides for the Grand Jury Clause (a person cannot be tried for an 
offense that carries the death penalty unless indicted by a grand jury) and the Double Jeopardy 
Clause (ordinarily, if a person has been tried and either acquitted or convicted and sentenced 
to imprisonment, the person cannot be tried again for the same offense and sentenced to 
death). U.S. CONST. amend. V. (4).  A person is also entitled to the protections provided by 
the Supreme Court’s expansion of the rights it deems to be fundamental, that is, substantive 
due process.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Collins v. 
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)) (in establishing when a right is 
fundamental, based on its past tests and formulations, the Court has looked to “history, legal 
traditions, and practices [to] provide the crucial ‘guide-posts for responsible decision-
making.’”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (holding that marriage is a 
fundamental right and applied with equal force to same-sex couples). 
 155. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born 
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside.  No state shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 156. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see generally John Bessler, A Century in the Making: 
The Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, and the Origins of the U.S. Constitution’s 
Eight Amendment, 27 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 989 (2019). 
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Regardless of the constitutional allowance on the Government’s right 
to execute a life, some States, and even the Supreme Court for a short time, 
have found that human life is so sacred that the Government is absolutely 
forbidden from taking a life.157  This prohibition is also supported by 
international human rights principles and treaties, which were adopted and 
ratified by the United States.158  Relative to the George Floyd Anti-Lynching 
Code, the sanctity of life is embraced as a fundamental and constitutional 
right that should predominate over other constitutional provisions, when in 
conflict.  Additionally, over the centuries, the U.S. has recognized that Black 
lives are particularly vulnerable to government-sponsored abuse,159 as will 
be discussed next. 
Next, we will explore (1) a brief legal history of enslavement, 
oppression, and discrimination of Blacks, (2) an explanation of how and why 
Black lives are constitutionally and statutorily protected, and (3) evidence 
that the Government has failed to protect Black lives against police killings. 
African Americans have experienced a long history of State-sponsored 
oppression160 and harmful discrimination.161  From its inception, the 
Constitution supported the enslavement of Blacks.162 Following the Civil 
                                                 
 157. In 1972 the US Supreme Court struck capital punishment statutes in Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), reducing all death sentences pending at the time to life 
imprisonment, subsequently many states passed new death penalty statutes and the court 
affirmed the legality of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  
 158. See Eur. Convention on Human Rights art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 
(protecting the right of every person to his or her life and imposing on the state, through its 
agents, to refrain from itself causing the deprivation of life and to investigate instances of 
alleged unjustified use of lethal force). 
 159. See the Reconstruction Amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments) which 
sought to protect the constitutional rights of the newly freed enslaved people of African 
descent. In particular, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“… No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 160. As the Confederate leadership regained power in the South, southern legislatures 
enacted “black codes,” state-sanctioned, racially based controls on the lives, liberty, and 
property rights of Blacks.  See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER 
NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 
(2008). 
 161. See generally Meilan Solly, 58 Resources to Understand Racism in America, 
SMITHSONIANMAG.COM (June 4, 2020, 11:47 AM), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/ 
history/158-resources-understanding-systemic-racism-america-180975029/. 
 162. Prior to the Civil War, the Constitution protected the institution of enslavement and 
did not consider Blacks as U.S. citizens.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3., or the Enumeration 
Clause or Three-Fifths Compromise. Article 1, Section 9 protected the legalization of the 
trade and the importation of enslaved persons of African descent (“The Migration and 
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, 
shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and 
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War, the Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution163 sought to 
guarantee the legal status of Blacks as free citizens, prohibiting 
enslavement,164 guaranteeing citizenship,165 and granting Black males the 
right to vote.166  In 1870 and 1871, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Congress enacted two Enforcement Acts and the Ku Klux Klan Act, all 
designed to protect Blacks from being terrorized by private citizens and 
public officials.167  These statutes as embodied in Title 18; Sections 241168 
and 242169 provide for criminal liability and  Sections 1983 and 14141 
                                                 
eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for 
each Person.”  Id. art 1, § 9).  Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3, or the Fugitive Slave Clause, 
required: “No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping 
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from 
such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom Service or 
Labour may be due.”  Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.  See also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 
(1857) (holding that “a negro, whose ancestors were imported into [the U.S.], and sold as 
slaves,” whether enslaved or free, was not and could not be a U.S. citizen). 
 163. The Reconstruction Amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments) abolished 
enslavement, guaranteed citizenship rights, and voting rights of newly freed Blacks.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment echoes the Fifth Amendment’s protection of the sanctity of life.  See 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“… No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall be duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
 165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“…No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 166. U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”).  
 167. See generally DAVID MARK CHALMERS, BACKFIRE: HOW THE KU KLUX KLAN HELPED 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 72–74 (2005); MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND 
SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN 
SOUTH (1987). 
 168. See 18 U.S.C. § 242; Conspiracy Against Rights [hereinafter “Conspiracy Against 
Rights”], https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/federal-civil-rights-statutes (making “it 
unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any 
person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or 
privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because 
of his/her having exercised the same)”).  The law was enacted and is protected pursuant to 
constitutionally granted authority granted by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 169. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996); Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law [hereinafter 
“Color of Law”], https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/federal-civil-rights-statutes 
(making “it a crime for any person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
or custom to willfully deprive or cause to be deprived from any person those rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the U.S.  This law further 
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provide for civil liability.170  As will be discussed later, these federal statutes 
have been deemed ineffective due to Supreme Court decisions.171 
The Federal Government’s protection of Blacks was short lived.172  
Following Reconstruction and the restoration of southern white 
supremacy,173 the Supreme Court diminished the protective impact of the 
                                                 
prohibits a person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to 
willfully subject or cause to be subjected any person to different punishments, pains, or 
penalties, than those prescribed for punishment of citizens on account of such person being 
an alien or by reason of his/her color or race.  Acts under ‘color of any law’ include acts not 
only done by federal, state, or local officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful 
authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful authority; provided 
that, in order for unlawful acts of any official to be done under ‘color of any law,’ the unlawful 
acts must be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the performance of 
his/her official duties….”).  There are four elements to establish offenses under this section: 
(1) the victim must have been an inhabitant of a U.S. state, district, or territory when the 
alleged violation occurred; (2) defendant acted under color of any law; (3) the defendant’s 
conduct deprived the victim of some right secured or protected by the U.S. Constitution; and 
(4) the defendant acted willfully, that is, with specific intent to violate the protected 
constitutional right. 
 170. Civil cases may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (now 34 
U.S.C. § 12601).  Claims under § 1983 can be filed by citizens for civil rights violations by 
persons acting under “color of law,” that is, police or other government officials.  Whereas § 
14141 is a civil remedy available to the government against a law enforcement agency to 
correct “policies and practices that fostered the misconduct and, where appropriate, may 
require individual relief for the victim(s).”  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (“Every person who, 
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory 
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”). 
 171. See generally Matthew V. Hess, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal 
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 153 (1993).  See also Barry C. 
Scheck, Criminal Prosecution and Section 1983, 16 TOURO L. REV. 895 (2000); Addressing 
Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/addressing-police-misconduct-laws-enforced-department-justice 
(last updated Feb. 28, 2019); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive 
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009). 
 172. See generally JUAN WILLIAM, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 
1954–1965 (1987) (documenting the Black struggle for civil rights). 
 173. See CHALMERS, supra note 166. 
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Fourteenth Amendment;174 again exposing Black lives to renewed 
exploitation, oppression, and abuse.175 
Then, in 1954, the Court issued the landmark decision of Brown v. 
Board of Education176 holding that racially segregated public schools were 
unconstitutional.177  That decision restored Blacks’ hope that the Federal 
Government and the courts would once again be an ally in their struggle for 
equal justice.178  The jurisdictional posture of the Brown decision was 
consistent with a series of the Court’s decisions, encompassing several of the 
specific entitlements from the Bill of Rights, thereby binding the States.179  
As a result, today, such civil liberties provide protection against both Federal 
and State governments and are now analyzed under the auspices of 
“fundamentality.”180 
                                                 
 174. See, e.g., the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81–83 (1872) (effectively limited 
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution to federal rights, such as the 
right to interstate travel, but not “state rights” such as intra-state travel); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (in a case where a white mob killed a hundred Blacks, the 
Court ruled that the First and Second Amendments do not apply to state governments, further 
restricting the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, and resulting in no convictions of the 
perpetrators).  However, in the 1920s, the Supreme Court began a series of decisions that 
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to “incorporate” most portions of the Bill of Rights, 
making these portions, for the first time, enforceable against the State governments.  See, e.g., 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (expressly holding that States were bound to 
protect freedom of speech). 
 175. See generally JUAN WILLIAM, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 
1954–1965 (1987) (documenting the Black struggle for civil rights). 
 176. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (ruling that U.S. State laws establishing racial segregation 
in public schools were unconstitutional, even if the segregated schools were otherwise equal 
in quality).  This was followed by decades of the battle of the desegregation of public schools, 
including universities.  See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1990) (documenting the 
role federal circuit court judges played in the implementation of the Brown decision). 
 177. Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 178. See WILLIAM, supra note 174. 
 179. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000).  
Under Selective Incorporation, the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses to “incorporate” individual elements of the Bill of Rights against 
the states.  Id. 
 180. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 267 (3d Cir.1990) (“The test usually 
articulated for determining fundamentality under the Due Process Clause is that the putative 
right must be ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’, or ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.”) (internal references omitted).  In 2010, in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778, 791 (2010), the Court incorporated the Second Amendment’s 
right to bear arms into the protection against state actions, holding that the right to bear arms 
as a fundamental and individual right that will necessarily be subject to strict scrutiny by the 
courts). 
BLACK LIVES MATTER: BANNING POLICE LYNCHINGS 
34 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY Vol. 48:1 
In the 1960s, Blacks pressed for their constitutional rights through 
peaceful civil rights protests, marches, and sit-ins.181  In 1964, in response to 
the movement, Congress enacted legislation and President Lyndon B. 
Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964.182 
Hence, the Federal Government has both a constitutional and a statutory 
duty to protect Blacks from police officers who violate people’s civil 
rights183 or commit hate crimes.184  The laws provide federal courts with the 
jurisdiction to protect Black lives, recognizing that throughout our history, 
Blacks are particularly vulnerable to both governmental and societal abuse 
and should be afforded special, federal protection.185  Yet, even today, there 
is no federal statute that expressly prohibits the police use of deadly force 
against Blacks.186 
Consequently, the Federal Government has a duty to protect Black lives 
that includes investigating claims that civil rights have been violated.187  
Recently, in January 2019, in furtherance of the need to monitor police 
behavior, the FBI launched a national use-of-force database for officer-
involved shootings or incidents in which police used excessive force.188  
                                                 
 181. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, HISTORY.COM., http://www.history. 
com/topics/black-history/civil-rights-act (last updated Sept. 20, 2018); WILLIAM, supra note 
174. 
 182. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (U.S. federal 
anti-discrimination law protects groups of people with a common characteristic, from 
discrimination on the basis of that characteristic, including race, color, religion, national 
origin, and other such categories). 
 183. Conspiracy Against Rights, supra note 167; Color of Law, supra note 168; see also 
Addressing Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/addressing-police-misconduct-laws-enforced-department-justice 
(last updated Feb. 28, 2019). 
 184. See 18 U.S.C. § 249; Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention 
Act, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/federal-civil-rights-statutes (making “it 
unlawful to willfully cause bodily injury—or attempting to do so with fire, firearm, or other 
dangerous weapon—when 1) the crime was committed because of the actual or perceived 
race, color, religion, national origin of any person, or 2) the crime was committed because of 
the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
or disability of any person and the crime affected interstate or foreign commerce or occurred 
within federal special maritime and territorial jurisdiction….”). 
 185. See WILLIAM, supra note 174. 
 186. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46, at 17. 
 187. See U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § 1.  The U.S. Justice Department has the statutory 
authority to investigate alleged violations of civil rights.  See generally Debra Livingston, 
Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 815, 842 n.138 (1999).   
 188. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL USE-OF-FORCE DATA COLLECTION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/use-of-force; BUREAU OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS, SEC. 
210402; Data on Use of Excessive Force, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=84; The 
Marshall Project and other nonprofits have also been collecting this data prior to the FBI’s 
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Unfortunately, the mere monitoring of police use of lethal force has not 
saved lives, and apparently has not resulted in federal prosecutions.  Relative 
to the George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code, the sanctity of Black lives is 
particularly embraced as a fundamental and constitutional right that should 
predominate over other constitutional provisions, when in conflict. 
At first glance, the civil rights statutes appear to be a compelling 
authority to protect Black lives from police brutality.  However, the facts 
evidence otherwise.189  The Justice Department reported that federal 
prosecutors declined to pursue civil rights allegations against law 
enforcement officers ninety-six percent of the time.190  This reality is hard to 
explain to a victim’s family who watched as a police officer callously killed 
their loved ones.  In order to understand this stark and painful reality, we 
need to analyze the Court’s doctrines that fundamentally negate the 
effectiveness of the civil rights laws. 
As presented next, there are reasons why federal officials fail to 
prosecute these clear violations of the civil rights of Blacks.  Federal 
prosecutions of police officers for use of lethal force are solidly blocked by 
three Supreme Court doctrines, which eviscerate the federal civil rights laws 
by constructing a high burden of proof standard for punishing police 
misconduct.  
 
2. The Court’s Blue Shield Frustrates Prosecutions. 
 
The prior subsection explained that the sanctity of life, and particularly 
of Black lives, is strongly protected by the Constitution and the federal civil 
rights laws.  This, however, begs the question: how is it that police officers 
can blatantly terminate Black lives without accountability?  This subsection 
will describe three key Supreme Court doctrines relative to police 
accountability.  It will demonstrate that together the Court precedent grants 
police officers extraordinary protections against criminal liability for 
committing homicide while policing, effectively creating the Blue Shield.191  
                                                 
database; see MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, (updated June 30, 2020), https://mappingpolice 
violence.org/; FATAL ENCOUNTERS, https://fatalencounters.org/. 
 189. See generally Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive 
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of 
Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3207–09 (2014); Dukanovic, supra note 51. 
 190. Brian Bowling & Andrew Conte, Trib Investigation: Cops Often Let off Hook for 
Civil Rights Complaints, TRIBLIVE (Mar. 12, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://triblive.com/usworld/ 
nation/9939487-74/police-rights-civil.  This reality will be explored in Part III, B.  This reality 
will be explored in Part III, B.  
 191. Alison M. Smith, Overview of Selected Federal Criminal Civil Rights Statutes, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Dec. 16, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R43830.pdf. “State actors” may also include prison guards, judges, and others who are acting 
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The next discussion shows how the Court greatly limited the reach of the 
federal civil rights, through this aforementioned Blue Shield. 
 
a. Specific Intent to Deprive a Constitutional Right 
 
As discussed above, the greatest sources of protecting a Black person 
from police abuse are the Constitution and the civil rights laws.  However, 
the Court, in a narrow decision, created the first major roadblock to the 
prosecution of police officers for killing Blacks.192 
In 1945, in Screws v. United States,193 the Court reviewed the civil 
rights act,194 which resulted in the federal conviction of a sheriff.195  This was 
an all-too-familiar case, where a white male sheriff beat to death a 
handcuffed Black male, accused of stealing a tire.196  In reaching its final 
holding, the Court analyzed the civil rights law at issue, finding (1) the 
constitutionality of the civil rights criminal act against a due process 
challenge that alleged it was vague and lacked specificity,197 (2) the act 
originated as an “anti-discrimination measure” that was later extended to 
prohibit the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities” guaranteed 
by federal law, after examining its legislative history,198 and (3) that the 
legislative history indicated a desire to reduce the section’s severity as 
reflected in Congress’s special requirement of intent to violate federal rights, 
                                                 
as public officials.  See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (finding that the actions 
of election commissioners who conducted a primary election and willfully altered and falsely 
counted and certified ballots were acts under color of state law depriving the voter of 
constitutional rights); (finding that state judge may be found criminally liable for civil rights 
violations).  A private actor may also act “under color of law” under certain circumstances.  
See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980). 
 192. Id.  
 193. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
 194. Id. at 94.  In Screws, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the predecessor 
of Section 242, 18 U.S.C. § 52, and upheld its constitutionality against a due process challenge 
that alleged that the statute was vague and lacked the specificity constitutionally mandated 
for criminal statutes.  In reaching its decision, the Court examined the legislative history and 
noted the section’s origins as an “anti-discrimination measure” that was later extended to 
prohibit the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities” guaranteed by federal law.  
The Court concluded that the legislative history indicated a desire to reduce the section’s 
severity.  To express this reduction in severity, Congress created a special requirement of 
intent to violate federal rights, rather than just a generalized “bad purpose.” 
 195. 18 U.S.C. § 52 (the predecessor of today’s Section 242). 
 196. In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the local U.S. Attorney convened a 
grand jury that indicted a sheriff, Screws, in Baker County, Georgia the lethal beating of the 
handcuffed Black male, Hall.  See Smith, supra note 190.  
 197. See Smith, supra note 190. 
 198. Screws, 325 U.S. at 91. 
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rather than just a generalized “bad purpose.”199  The majority decision, 
penned by Justice William O. Douglas, determined: 
 
One who does act with such specific intent is aware that what 
he does is precisely that which the statute forbids . . . He violates the 
statute not merely because he has a bad purpose but because he acts 
in defiance of announced rules of law.200 
 
Using this narrow construction, the Court reversed the conviction 
against the sheriff, concluding that the jury should have been instructed on 
the specific intent to deprive the victim of a constitutional right.201  Following 
this precedent, federal courts have interpreted Screws to strictly construe the 
federal authority to prosecute a civil rights violation.202  Arguably, the 
specific intent requirement established in Screws makes a federal 
prosecution nearly impossible, requiring the prosecutor to show (1) the 
accused’s intent to violate the victim’s federal rights, (2) the action was done 
under “color of law,” and (3) the force was unreasonable, unnecessary, and 
unprovoked.203  As a result, a strict interpretation of section 242 has been 
uniformly followed by federal courts,204 requiring proof of the defendant’s 
specific intent to deprive a victim of a constitutional or federal right.205 
Hence, due to the Screws’ precedent,206 relative to police use of lethal 
force, the current federal laws fail to result in the successful federal 
                                                 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 106. 
 201. Then, upon retrial, the Government failed to prove that the sheriff’s willful intent to 
deprive the Black victim of his constitutional rights when he killed him.  Screws, 325 U.S. at 
101.  See CHALMERS, supra note 166. 
 202. See, e.g., U.S. v. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (stating, “[e]ven the 
specific intent to injure, or the reckless use of excessive force, without more, does not satisfy 
the requirements of 242 as construed in Screws.  There must exist an intention to ‘punish or 
to prevent the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as the right to vote, or to 
obtain equal protection of the law.”  Id. at 501). 
 203. See Smith, supra note 190. 
 204. See Smith, supra note 190. 
 205. See United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156 (3rd Cir. 1972) (stating, “Thus we 
conclude that in a criminal prosecution under 242, it is only where there is supportive evidence 
found by the fact finder of a willful intention to deprive another of his constitutional rights 
that the federal statute comes into play. It is one thing to be guilty of excessive force, and thus 
chargeable with violating the law of the state and territory; it is quite another for a policeman 
to administer a physical beating as punishment for allegedly breaking the law. In the latter 
case the police offer has acted as prosecutor, judge, and jury; he has brought the charges, 
found the suspect guilty, administered punishment.”  Id. at 161 (emphasis added). 
 206. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 91. 
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investigations and prosecutions of wrongdoers.207  This fact became clear 
following the shootings of Trayvon Martin in 2012 and of Michael Brown in 
2014.208 
Each case demonstrates that a police officer’s wrongdoings are greatly 
shielded from federal criminal liability,209 as the Screws decision practically 
bars the Federal Government from charging a police officer for the wrongful 
use of lethal force, making it the local authorities’ sole responsibility.210 
The Screws case raised the burden of proof standard and, thereby, 
diminished the application of the civil rights laws.  It is still precedent and 
continues to frustrate federal prosecution for civil rights violations.211  We 
continue with a second Supreme Court doctrine, qualified immunity, and 
explain how police accountability remains frustrated. 
 
b. Qualified Immunity Exempts Police from Liability212 
 
Next, we present the second Court doctrine that frustrates the 
constitutional mandate to protect a person’s life from wrongful governmental 
infringements, with (1) a brief history of the development of the Court’s 
                                                 
 207. U.S.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., FY 2014 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: 
CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 20–21 (2014) (reporting that in cases brought in 2011, out of 
10,000 complaints, only 224 officers were charged); Chad Flanders & Joseph Welling, Police 
Use of Deadly Force: State Statutes 30 Years after Garner, 35 ST LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 109 (2016); 
Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using Congressional 
Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 370 (2011). 
 208. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 206.  Then-U.S. Attorney 
General Eric Holder called on Congress to lower the bar on the standard the Justice 
Department must meet to prosecute civil rights cases.  Moreover, under then-President Barack 
Obama, the Justice Department aggressively investigated police shootings. 
 209. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 206. 
 210. See infra Part III, B, for a discussion of the obstacles that police departments and 
local prosecutors have in bringing such prosecutions. 
 211. Under state and federal law, including all provisions of the Civil Rights Act, Sections 
241, 242, and 1983, it is difficult for the prosecution to succeed in such claims, if the 
investigation ever gets to that stage.  Police Avoided Federal Civil Rights Charges in 96% of 
Cases over 20 Years––Report, RT (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.rt.com/usa/335602-police-
civil-right-charges/ (“Based on analysis of nearly 3 million records from the US Department 
of Justice’s National Caseload Data, the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review found that the 94 US 
Attorney offices declined 12,703 referrals of potential civil rights violations made by the FBI 
and other agencies out of a total of 13,233 complaints.”); cf. Marc Debbaudt, Legislation 
Calling for Independent Police Prosecutor Is Unnecessary, L.A. ASS’N DEPUTY DISTRICT 
ATTORNEYS (June 9, 2015), https://www.laadda.com/legislation-calling-for-independent-poli 
ce-prosecutor-is-unnecessary/; Eric Lichtblau, Bush Sees U.S. as Meddling in Local Police 
Affairs, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jun/01/news/mn-36333. 
 212. See generally Colin Rolfs, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA 
L. REV. 468 (2011); Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified 
Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62 (2016). 
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doctrine of “qualified immunity,”213 (2) followed by an argument that this 
doctrine wrongfully precludes claims against police officers who harm 
Blacks.214 
The Enforcement Acts and the Ku Klux Klan Act215 were specifically 
enacted to protect Blacks from State-sponsored, white supremacists’ 
retaliation and oppression following the Civil War and Reconstruction.216 As 
previously mentioned, the effect of these provisions was short lived217 and 
later solidly negated by Supreme Court decisions, including and following 
Screws, which greatly reduced criminal liability.218  However, in 1961 
Monroe v. Pape,219 the Court changed its approach to the prosecution of civil 
actions for police brutality cases, permitting such claims to move forward 
without restrictions.220  Hence, it was arguably within the context of 
increasing civil rights claims in federal court that the Court adopted the 
doctrine of qualified immunity.221 
                                                 
 213. See generally Legal Information Institute, Qualified Immunity, CORNELL LAW, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/qualified_immunity (“Specifically, qualified immunity 
protects a government official from lawsuits alleging that the official violated a plaintiff's 
rights, only allowing suits where officials violated a ‘clearly established’ statutory or 
constitutional right. When determining whether or not a right was ‘clearly established,’ courts 
consider whether a hypothetical reasonable official would have known that the defendant’s 
conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights. Courts conducting this analysis apply the law that was 
in force at the time of the alleged violation, not the law in effect when the court considers the 
case….  Qualified immunity is not immunity from having to pay money damages, but rather 
immunity from having to go through the costs of a trial at all. Accordingly, courts must resolve 
qualified immunity issues as early in a case as possible, preferably before discovery.”). 
 214. See generally Amir H. Ali & Emily Clark, Qualified Immunity: Explained, THE 
APPEAL (June 20, 2019), https://theappeal.org/qualified-immunity-explained/ (noting “[t]his 
standard shields law enforcement, in particular, from innumerable constitutional violations 
each year.  In the Supreme Court’s own words, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.’ It is under this rule that officers can, without worry, 
drag a nonthreatening, seven months pregnant woman into the street and tase (sic) her three 
times for refusing to sign a piece of paper.”); Jamie Ehrlich, The Question Before the Supreme 
Court Is Who Polices the Police, CNN (June 3, 2020, 5:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2020/06/03/politics/supreme-court-qualified-immunity-police-accountability-george-floyd/ 
index.html.  
 215. See infra Part III, A, 2, these laws were enacted in 1870 and 1871 and currently 
embodied in Sections 241, 242, and 1983. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that the purpose of Section 1983 
was “to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities 
by an official’s abuse of his position.”). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See Ali & Clark, supra note 213. 
BLACK LIVES MATTER: BANNING POLICE LYNCHINGS 
40 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY Vol. 48:1 
From the Court’s initial adoptions of qualified immunity, the doctrine 
was used to minimize police officers’ personal liability for wrongdoings.222  
In 1967, in Pierson v. Ray,223 the Court first introduced the doctrine of 
qualified immunity.224  This allowed for police officers to escape from 
personal liability from being sued for civil rights violations under Section 
1983,225 so long as they acted in “good faith” and believed that their conduct 
was authorized by law.226  However, in 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents,227 the Court decided that claimants had a federal cause of 
action for damages, if a federal official violated a restricted list of 
constitutional rights.228 
Throughout the 1980s, the Court continuously and drastically expanded 
the qualified immunity defense.  In 1982, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,229 the 
Court held that the protection afforded to public officials would no longer 
                                                 
 222. Id. 
 223. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (relative to exonerating police officers from 
personal liability, the Court justified the need for qualified immunity by reasoning that “[a] 
policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction 
of duty if he does not arrest when he had probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he 
does.”  Id. at 555). 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. (that “[a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being 
charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he had probable cause and being 
mulcted in damages if he does.”). 
 227. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that while 
there is no explicit right to file a civil lawsuit against federal government officials who have 
violated the Fourth Amendment, this right can be inferred.  This is because a constitutional 
protection would not be meaningful if there were no way to seek a remedy for a violation of 
it).  Parenthetically, the Court expressly reserved the question of whether qualified immunity 
applied, as the Court of Appeals had not rules on that issue. 
 228. Id.  However, not all Constitutional violations give rise to a Bivens cause of action, 
in addition to the Fourth Amendment which was in Bivens, the Court recognized such claims 
for violations of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component of due process in Davis 
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) and the Eighth Amendment in Carlson v. Green, 446 
U.S. 14, 25 (1980).  See generally Actions Against Federal Agencies and Officers, 14 FED. 
PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3655 (4th ed.). 
 229. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding “that [federal] government 
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Id. at 818).  The Court 
reasoned that “the need to protect officials who are required to exercise discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.”  Id. at 800.  
The Court noted that [w]e emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages 
arising from actions within the scope of an official’s duties and in ‘objective’ good faith.  We 
express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be 
available.”  Id. at 819, fn. 34.  This case involved White House aides to former President 
Nixon, not law enforcement officers. 
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turn on whether the official acted in “good faith.”230  Instead, an official, even 
when acting in a malicious manner and violating a person’s constitutional 
rights, is immune from personal liability unless the claimant could show that 
the right was “clearly established.”231  Equally significantly, in Harlow, the 
Court pronounced that qualified immunity had a preemptive procedural role, 
one that denied a claimant’s right to proceed in federal court.232 
Relative to liability for police brutality, the Court quickly applied this 
broad concept of qualified immunity to limit personal liability in Fourth 
Amendment searches.  In 1986, in Malley v. Briggs,233 the Court held that 
qualified immunity does not apply to a police officer when the officer 
wrongfully arrests someone on the basis of a warrant, but only if the officer 
could not have reasonably believed that there was probable cause for the 
warrant.234  Then, in 1987, in Anderson v. Creighton,235 the Court again 
applied a broad interpretation of qualified immunity, holding that, when an 
officer of the law (here, an FBI officer) conducts a search and violates the 
Fourth Amendment, that officer is entitled to qualified immunity, if the 
officer proves that a reasonable officer could have believed that the search 
constitutionally complied with the Fourth Amendment.236 
Fourteen years later, the Court reiterated its pronouncement in Harlow 
on the uniquely preemptive procedural role of qualified immunity.  In 2001, 
in Saucier v. Katz,237 the Court held that a ruling on a qualified immunity 
                                                 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808 (the Court noted, quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 
(1978):  
Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the 
possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim 
for relief . . . , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Court 
recognized in Scheuer that damages suits concerning constitutional violations 
need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion 
for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity. . . . In responding to 
such a motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not 
harassed by frivolous lawsuits. 
Butz, 438 U.S. 507-08 (citations omitted). (emphasis added). 
Id. at 457. 
 233. Malley v. Briggs, 457 U.S. 335 (1986),  
 234. Reasonability is determined by the action that an objectively reasonable officer 
would take. 
 235. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
 236. See id. at 636.  The relevant question that a court should ask is whether a reasonable 
officer could have believed the warrantless search to be lawful, considering clearly established 
law and the information which the officer possessed.  The Supreme Court also held that 
“subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant.” 
 237. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
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defense must be made early in the trial court’s proceeding, because qualified 
immunity is a defense to stand trial, not merely a defense from liability.238  
The Court elaborated a two-part test or sequence for whether a government 
official is entitled to qualified immunity: (1) a court must look at whether the 
facts indicate that a constitutional right has been violated and (2) if so, a court 
must then look at whether that right was clearly established at the time of the 
alleged conduct.  Thus, the Saucier test for qualified immunity will apply, 
unless the officer’s conduct clearly violated a suspect’s constitutional 
right(s).239  This test has been criticized as stifling the development of 
constitutional rights.240  However, in 2009, in Pearson v. Callahan,241 the 
Court restricted the application of the Saucier test,242 holding that the Saucier 
sequencing does not need to be applied in qualified immunity claims.243  
Furthermore, the Court broadly increased the application of qualified 
immunity to searches.244 
Despite its expansive application of the doctrine, the Court recognized 
an exception to qualified immunity.  In 2002, in Hope v. Pelzer,245 the Court 
found that an officer does not have qualified immunity where his cruelty was 
“so obvious” that he should have had “fair warning” that his actions were 
unconstitutional and contrary to the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual 
                                                 
 238. When there is a summary judgment motion for qualified immunity, the court should 
rule on the motion, even if a material issue of fact remains on the underlying claim. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See generally Ted Sampsell Jones et al., Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 623 (2011) (discussing that the Court’s retreat from the mandatory Saucier 
order was due to the lower courts’ difficulty in applying the mandatory Saucier framework); 
Pierre N. Level, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 NYU L. REV. 1249 
(2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s command in Saucier that before dismissing a 
constitutional tort suit by reason of good faith immunity, a court must first declare in dictum 
where the alleged conduct violates the Constitution, is ill advised). 
 241. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 242. Id. at 227. 
 243. Rather, a trial court should have more discretion in whether it should apply Saucier, 
536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
 244. Id. at 243–44.  (“[a]n officer conducting a search is entitled to qualified immunity 
where clearly established law does not show that the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment.”); see also Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009), 
where the Court held that even when an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be safe from 
unreasonable search and seizure is violated, the person performing the search may still be 
immune under qualified immunity, if “clearly established law does not show that the search 
violated the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 243. 
 245. Saucier, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (in that case, corrections officers disciplined a prisoner 
by handcuffing him to a hitching post for seven hours, with his hands above his shoulders, 
shirtless in the summer sun, and being taunted the prisoner by giving water to a guard dog in 
plain sight). 
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punishment standard.246  As a result, the Court affirmed the denial of a 
motion for summary judgement.247  This case has not taken hold to diminish 
the effectiveness of qualified immunity which is under attack by civil rights 
proponents and others as will be discussed next. 
Qualified immunity has been sharply criticized for various reasons,248 
particularly because it hinders the protection and development of civil 
rights.249  Relative to the lives of Blacks, the doctrine protects police officers 
from being personally accountable, even when an officer clearly violated a 
person’s federal or constitutional rights.250  One study concluded that 
qualified immunity “has become a nearly failsafe tool to let police brutality 
go unpunished and deny victims their constitutional rights.251 
Pursuant of the accountability for police officers’ killings of Blacks, the 
Movement recently advocated for the end of qualified immunity in excessive 
force cases.252  However, on June 15, 2020, in Baxter v. Bracey,253 where an 
                                                 
 246. Saucier, 536 U.S. at 741.   
 247. Id. at 736–48 (the defense of qualified immunity was precluded at the summary 
judgment phase, noting “The Eighth Amendment violation here is obvious on the facts 
alleged.  Any safety concerns had long since abated by the time Hope was handcuffed to the 
hitching post, because he had already been subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and 
transported back to prison …  Despite the clear lack of emergency, respondents knowingly 
subjected him to a substantial risk of physical harm, unnecessary pain, unnecessary exposure 
to the sun, prolonged thirst and taunting, and a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a 
risk of particular discomfort and humiliation.” 
 248. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, YALE L.J. (2017), retrieved 
Feb. 26, 2020). 
 249. See Ali & Clark, supra note 213 (noting that qualified immunity hinders the 
protection of civil rights in three ways: (1) victims of brutality or harassment by law 
enforcement generally get no relief in court and have no ability to hold offending officers 
accountable for their actions, (2) many claims will never be brought to court in the first place, 
acting as a disincentive for lawyers to bring such claims, and (3) “freezes” the development 
of constitutional law, instead of reviewing, analyzing, and applying constitutional doctrine to 
determine whether a person’s rights were violated. 
 250. See Ian Millhiser, Why Police Can Violate your Constitutional Rights and Suffer No 
Consequences in Court, VOX (June 3, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/3/21277104/ 
qualified-immunity-cops-constitution-shaniz-west-supreme-court; John P. Gross, Qualified 
Immunity and the Use of Force: Making the Reckless into the Reasonable, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L. 
L. REV. 67 (2017); Jordan S. Rubin et al., How the Law Shields Cops From Suit: Qualified 
Immunity Explained, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 5, 2020, 2:46 PM), https://news.bloom 
berglaw.com/us-law-week/how-the-law-shields-cops-from-suit-qualified-immunity-explaine 
d?context=article-related; Andrew Satter, Qualified Immunity: Origins of a Police Liability 
Shield (Video) BLOOMBERG LAW (July 24, 2020, 1:47 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw. 
com/us-law-week/qualified-immunity-origins-of-a-police-liability-shield-video. 
 251. See Andrew Chung et al., Special Report: For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court 
Protection, REUTERS (May 30, 2020), https://web.archive.org/web/20200612051417/ 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-immunity-scotus-specialrep-idUSKBN22K18C. 
 252. See generally id. 
 253. Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020). 
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appellate federal court applied qualified immunity when a police officer 
unleashed attack dogs on a suspect, after the suspect had been 
apprehended,254 the Court declined to review the doctrine.255  Further, from 
a legislative prospective, members of Congress have proposed bills to end 
qualified immunity when applied to police violations of federal rights, but 
with no success to date.256 
The frequency of such cases has prompted a growing chorus of criticism 
from lawyers, legal scholars, civil rights groups, politicians and even judges 
that qualified immunity, as applied, is unjust,257 including members of the 
Court.258  Spanning the political spectrum, this broad coalition says the 
                                                 
 254. Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020).  Parenthetically, Justice Clarence Thomas 
dissented to this decision, stating that qualified immunity should be reformed to allow 
individuals a right to sue state officers for damages and to remedy violations of the 
individuals’ constitutional rights. 
 255. See Jamie Ehrlich et al., Supreme Court Declines to Weigh in on Legal Doctrine that 
Shields Law Enforcement, CNN (June 15, 2020, 11:57 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/ 
15/politics/supreme-court-qualified-immunity/index.html (reporting “[i]n recent years, legal 
scholars, judges and justices on all sides of the ideological spectrum have criticized the legal 
doctrine known as “qualified immunity,” arguing that it is not grounded in the proper legal 
authorities and too often shields officials from accountability.”); Jamie Ehrlich et al., Federal 
Judge Pens Scathing Opinion on Qualified Immunity: ‘Let Us Waste No Time in Righting This 
Wrong’, CNN (Aug. 4, 2020, 9:52 PM), http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2020/images/08/04/jamison-
v-mcclendon.pdf (providing a history of Black people’s battles against police brutality). 
 256. See David Morgan, U.S. Lawmaker Prepares Bill Aiming to End Court Protection 
for Police, REUTERS (June 4, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minneapolis-police-
congress/u-s-lawmaker-prepares-bill-aiming-to-end-court-protection-for-police-
idUSKBN23831W; see, e.g., Harris, Markey, Booker Introduce Senate Resolution to Abolish 
Qualified Immunity for Law Enforcement, Hold Officers Accountable for Police Brutality, 
WEBSITE OF U.S. SENATOR FOR CALIFORNIA KAMALA HARRIS (June 3, 2020); The Ending 
Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2019-2020); Seth Stoughton et al., How to 
Actually Fix America’s Police, THE ATLANTIC (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/how-actually-fix-americas-
police/612520/. 
 257. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 
(2018); Tahir Duckett, Unreasonably Immune: Rethinking Qualified Immunity in Fourth 
Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 (2016); John C. Jeffries Jr., 
What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FL. L. REV. 851 (2010). 
 258. See, e.g., Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1277 (2017), where in reviewing the U.S. Fifth Circuit’s granted of 
summary judgment for the respondent, a Houston police officer, who shot the petitioner in 
the back, the Court denied certiorari, with Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg dissenting and 
noting, “The question whether the officer used excessive force in shooting Salazar-Limon 
thus turns in large part on which man is telling the truth.  Our legal system entrusts this 
decision to a jury sitting as finder of fact, not a judge reviewing a paper record.”  See Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Sotomayor Sees “Disturbing Trend” of Failing to Intervene on Behalf of 
Victims of Police Shootings, AM. BAR J. (Apr. 24, 2017, 3:35 PM), http://www.abajournal. 
com/news/article/sotomayor_sees_disturbing_trend_of_failing_to_intervene_on_behalf_of_
victim/. 
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doctrine has become a failsafe tool to permit police brutality to go 
unpunished and deny victims their constitutional rights.259 
While qualified immunity is broad, it is not absolute.260  For example, 
a police officer, even while policing, can still be sued for intentionally 
violating a person’s constitutional rights, although intent is hard to prove.261  
Further, State criminal codes provide that any police action not sanctioned 
by the police department that is found to be illegal may lead to criminal 
charges.262 
In summary, the Court has inserted the immunity doctrine as an 
additional procedural and substantive barrier to holding police officers 
accountable for brutality.  In doing so, they added to the Screws case in 
raising the burden of proof standard and, thereby, diminishing the 
application of the civil rights laws.  However, the Court’s protection of police 
misdoings does not stop there.  In rare instance, where federal or state 
charges are made against rogue police officers, those officers are additionally 
protected by another Court doctrine, as will be discussed next. 
 
c. “Objective Reasonableness” 
 
Objective reasonableness, in combination with the two Court-generated 
doctrines already discussed, creates a nearly impenetrable legal shield which 
protects police officers from being held criminally liable for killing 
Blacks.263  The following analysis of the Court’s doctrine shows (1) the 
parameters of the doctrine and (2) argues why it fails to protect Black lives 
against police killings. 
The Court’s doctrine of objective reasonableness results from its 
development of a Fourth Amendment “search and seizure” approach to 
analyzing police use of lethal or excessive force.  This approach was 
developed in two cases, the first, in 1985, in Tennessee v. Garner264 and the 
second, in 1989, in Graham v. Connor.265  The doctrine creates a very high 
                                                 
 259. See generally Baude, supra note 256. 
 260. See generally Baude, supra note 256. 
 261. See Marcus Nemeth, How was That Reasonable? The Misguided Development of 
Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force by Law Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C.K. REV. 989 
(2019). 
 262. Under qualified immunity, the managers of police officers are also exempt from 
personal liability, contrary to respondeat superior, although the municipality or employing 
body is still civilly liable for the wrongdoing.  See Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, (2020), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/061520zor_f2bh.pdf. 
 263. See Jill I. Brown, Defining ‘Reasonable’ Police Conduct: Graham v. Connor and 
Excessive Force During Arrest, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1257–1286 (1991). 
 264. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 265. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
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barrier for indicting a police officer for using lethal force—needing to 
overcome the presumption that the officer believed at the time of the killing 
that his or another’s life was at risk.266  To understand the nature of that 
standard of culpability, we will (1) present the Garner Court’s adoption of 
the Fourth Amendment basis for assessing excessive force, (2) review the 
bases for the Graham Court’s expansion of the Garner analysis, and (3) 
critique the Graham Court’s objective reasonableness standard. 
We begin in 1985, with Tennessee v. Garner,267 in which the Court 
found the use of deadly force to prevent escape was an unreasonable seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment, in the absence of probable cause that the 
fleeing suspect posed a physical danger.268  In reaching its decision, the Court 
adopted a Fourth Amendment’s “search and seizure” analysis to assess the 
legality of excessive force, in lieu of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process approach.269  In doing so, the Court set forth instances in which an 
officer’s use of deadly force is reasonable.270  However, the Court framed 
the legal issue as one based on “the totality of the circumstances,” weighing 
the nature of the intrusion of the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights against 
the government interests which justified the intrusion.271  In this particular 
case, the Court found in favor of the suspect.272 
                                                 
 266. See infra discussion of the Graham decision. 
 267. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (Justice Byron White, writing for the majority; reviewed 
the facts that, on October 3, 1974, a Memphis police officer fatally shot a fleeing, unarmed 
suspect, a fifteen-year-old, as he began to climb a fence.  In a civil case, the officer relied on 
a Tennessee state statute and official Memphis Police Department policy authorizing deadly 
force against a fleeing suspect.  The statute provided that, "if, after notice of the intention to 
arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary 
means to effect the arrest.”  The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.). 
 268. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 269. Id. at 7 (“apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment”). 
 270. Id. (the Court stating (1) when threatened with a deadly weapon; (2) when the officer 
has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses an imminent threat of serious harm or 
death to the officer or to others; or (3) when probable cause exists that the suspect has 
committed a crime involving threatened or actual serious physical harm or death to another. 
 271. Id. 
 272. The Court noted that as the use of deadly force against a subject is the most intrusive 
type of seizure possible, because it deprives the suspect of his life, and that the state failed to 
present evidence that its interest in shooting unarmed fleeing suspects outweighs the suspect’s 
interest in his own survival.  The Court concluded, “[a] police officer may not seize an 
unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”  Id. at 11. 
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Four years later, in 1989, in Graham v. Connor,273 the Court elaborated 
on Garner’s approach to the boundaries of the police use of lethal force.274  
In Graham, the Court held that the lower court had incorrectly applied a test 
that focused on an officer’s subjective motivations.275  Instead, the Court held 
that the standard should be whether a police officer used an objectively 
unreasonable amount of force under the Fourth Amendment “search and 
seizure” analysis.276 
Prior to Graham, the federal courts had used the Due Process analysis 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to regulate the Government’s 
abuse of civil rights, along with the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual 
punishment” analysis for in police custodial abuse cases.277  However, in 
Graham, the Court rejected the notion that the judiciary should use the Due 
Process Clause, instead of the Fourth Amendment, in analyzing an excessive 
force claim.”278  In its decision, the Graham Court provided the basis for 
what constituted reasonableness, asserting that it applied to what is 
reasonable “under the given circumstances.”279 
                                                 
 273. Graham, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).  The facts of the case are worth mentioning. The 
plaintiff, Dethorne Graham, a Black man, who suffered from type 1 diabetes entered a 
convenience store to get orange juice but seeing a long line decided to leave.  The defendant, 
Connor, a Black police officer, became suspicious and pulled Graham over for an 
investigative stop to determine what he was doing at the store.  When backup officers arrived, 
one of the officers rolled Graham over on the sidewalk and applied handcuffs tightly behind 
Graham's back.  Several officers then lifted the still-unconscious body of Graham and put him 
face down on the hood a car.  Then four officers picked up Graham and threw him headfirst 
into the back of a police car.  Once Officer Connor confirmed that Graham had done nothing 
wrong at the convenience store, the officers drove him home and released him.  Due to the 
police encounter, Graham suffered a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and 
an injured shoulder. 
 274. Id. at 395. 
 275. Graham, 490 U.S. 386, at 397-98 (1989). 
 276. Id. at 395. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. (“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that 
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide 
for analyzing these claims.”)  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
stated, “Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an 
arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical 
coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”  Id. at 396.  Further, the Court stated that all claims that 
law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an 
arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment [search and seizure] and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.  Id. at 399. 
 279. Id. (“Because the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable 
of precise definition or mechanical application,” the test’s “proper application requires careful 
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”). 
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In Graham, the Court held that determining the objective 
reasonableness of a particular seizure under the Fourth Amendment 
“requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing 
governmental interests at stake.”280  As such, the Graham Court’s inquiry 
requires analyzing the totality of the circumstances from the officer’s 
perspective.281  As a result, the Graham decision is the prevailing standard 
for determining whether a police officer’s use of force is excessive or 
justified—whether a police officer reasonably believed his or her life, or the 
life of another, was being threatened at that time.282 
This doctrine is misguided for two reasons: (1) it promotes over-
policing by treating every police encounter as a “search” and (2) condones 
the use of lethal force by granting police virtually absolute immunity from 
criminal liability in the policing of nonfelonious suspects.  First, its 
application is overly broad as it wrongly views all lethal or excessive force 
cases as seizures strongly protected by the Fourth Amendment,283 ignoring 
the sanctity of life, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.284  This fatal constitutional misdirection sets in motion a 
                                                 
 280. Graham, 490 U.S. 386. at 394 (“Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in 
the context of an arrest . . . it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons 
. . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.’”). 
 281. Id. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 2022).  
 282. See Osagie K. Obasogie et al., The Futile Fourth Amendment: Understanding Police 
Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment of Graham v. Connor, 112 
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1465 (2018) (noting, that based on an empirical study, the Court’s 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment did not reflect a preexisting trend or consensus in the 
federal courts and has contributed to the perpetuation of police excessive use of force in many 
communities of color). 
 283. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (1989) (“Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises 
in the context of an arrest . . . it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons 
. . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.”). 
 284. Cf., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), in the context of high-
speed police pursuit of a motorcyclist, the Court has rejected a Fourth Amendment approach 
and instead used a Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis.  Id. at 836–37.  In a Section 
1983 claim against the sheriff’s deputy who caused their son’s death, based on deprivation of 
their son’s substantive due process right to life, while addressing a circuit split on the 
culpability level required to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation in high-speed pursuit 
cases, the Lewis Court also specifically rejected a Fourth Amendment analysis.  Id. at 836.  
The Court was presented with the question of whether deliberate or reckless indifference was 
enough to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation, or whether the higher “shock the 
conscience” standard must be met.  The Court held that the shock the conscience standard 
was applicable stating that “only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of 
arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for 
a due process violation.”  Id. at 836. 
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restrictive approach to judging police misconduct, unintentionally permitting 
wrongdoing to go unpunished.  Viewing a police officer’s lethal shooting as 
the apprehension of a suspect and, therefore, a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment is deficient protection of the suspect’s right to life: it ignores 
other controlling principles of constitutional law and deprives the law of 
moral principles.  This results in over-policing, as the Court grants police 
officers, with already pervasive authority, absolute criminal immunity from 
harming or even killing people. Consequently, police officers have virtually 
unfettered “search and seizure” authority in an arrest or investigatory stop.285 
The overextension of Graham is illustrated in 2014, in Plumhoff v. 
Rickard.286  There the Court found that officers did not use excessive force 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, when they killed a motorist and 
passenger by shooting fifteen times into their fleeing vehicle.287  Looking at 
the totality of the circumstances, the Court concluded that the officers acted 
reasonably as the driver’s reckless driving posed a grave public safety risk 
and under those circumstances the firing of fifteen shots was not 
excessive.288  Hence, the Court’s “objective reasonableness” test promotes 
police brutality and does not deter or address the authority to use lethal 
                                                 
 285. See, e.g., William J. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police 
Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551 (1984); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on 
the Fourth Amendment (1974) MINN. L. REV. 848, https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=1847&context=mlr. 
 286. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014). 
 287. Id.  The car was originally pulled over for an inoperable taillight, however, the Court 
found that the high-speed car chase that ensued endangered the lives of both the police, and 
bystanders. 
 288. Id. at 766 (according to the Court, “a reasonable officer could have concluded that 
[the driver] was intent on resuming his flight and that, if he was allowed to do so, he would 
once again pose a deadly threat to others.”). 
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force,289 and extends protection beyond the “rule of necessity” adopted by 
reputable law enforcement agencies.290 
Another example of how the Graham standard produces tragic 
consequences is the killing of Tamir Rice.291  In that case, a police officer 
was allowed to legally kill an unarmed child, because the officer stated he 
“reasonably believed” (objectively assessed) that the child was a threat to 
                                                 
 289. The Court continues to reaffirm its commitment to its Graham jurisprudence; see, 
e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1543–44 (2017) (reviewing the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s “provocation” rule, by which officers found to have 
acted reasonably on one Fourth Amendment claim could, nevertheless, be held liable for that 
action based on a separate Fourth Amendment violation that contributed to their need to use 
that force); id. at 1543.  The Court held that rule should be barred as it conflicts with Graham 
regarding the manner in which a claim of excessive force against a police officer should be 
determined in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of a plaintiff’s Fourth 
Amendment rights).  There, in a unanimous decision, the Court reiterated its controversial 
standard for assessing police criminal liability in lethal force cases.  Id at 1548; see also Whren 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (barring courts from considering a police officer’s 
subjective motivations for making police stops and conducting).  In rejecting the Ninth 
Circuit’s “provocation rule,” the Court upheld the standard outlined in Graham as the “settled 
and exclusive framework” for excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 
1548.  
 290. Memorandum on Resolution 14, supra note 20: 
The Department of Justice hereby establishes a uniform policy with respect to the 
use of deadly force in both custodial and non-custodial situations . . . . [T]he 
touchstone of the Department’s policy regarding the use of deadly force is 
necessity.  Use of deadly force must be objectively reasonable under all the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time . . . . 
Deadly force should never be used upon mere suspicion that a crime, no matter how 
serious, was committed, or simply upon the officer’s determination that probable 
cause would support the arrest of the person being pursued or arrested for the 
commission of a crime.  Deadly force may be used to prevent the escape of a fleeing 
subject if there is probable cause to believe: (1) the subject has committed a felony 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury or death, 
and (2) the escape of the subject would pose an imminent danger of death or serious 
physical injury to the officer or to another person. 
See also Olevia Boykin et al., Opinion, A Better Standard for the Use of Deadly Force, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/a-better-standard-for-the-
use-of-deadly-force.html?_r=0 (suggesting the adoption of a necessity rule—does not permit 
deadly force if non-deadly or less deadly alternatives are available and adequate to meet the 
threat); J. Michael McGuinness, Law Enforcement Use of Force: Safe and Effective Policing 
Requires Retention of the Reasonable Belief Standard, THE CHAMPION, May 2015 at 26, 27. 
 291. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan et al., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by Cleveland Police, 
Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 01/23/us/in-
tamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by-police-then-a-fatal-one.html (reporting on 
the November 22, 2014 case of Tamir Rice, a twelve year old Black male, killed in a 
Cleveland park by a white male police officer, who claims the boy had a pistol, which turned 
out to be a toy, in which the grand jury failed to indict). 
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himself, his fellow officer, and potentially to others.292  Under the Graham 
standard, this would apply even where the child was thirty feet away from 
the officer and was walking away with his or her back facing the officer.  
This doctrine is devoid of moral principles and disregards the sanctity of life.  
This doctrine places the burden of proof on the (sometimes deceased) victim, 
to show that the officer’s action was unjustified.  This leads to the question 
under Graham—when is an officer’s use of lethal force ever unjustified?293 
The second critique is the Graham doctrine grants police officers 
virtually absolute immunity against criminal liability.  This is contrary to the 
Court’s better approach to protecting lives, as it established in civil liability 
cases, using a Fourteenth Amendment “due process” analysis, which relies 
on a “shock the conscious” approach.294  This critique was embraced by the 
Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis295 decided in line with Graham.  In 
a Section 1983 claim against the sheriff’s deputy who caused a young male’s 
death, the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment approach and instead used a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis.296  The Court held that the 
shock the conscience standard was applicable stating that “only a purpose to 
cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element 
of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process 
violation.”297 
Relying on Graham v. Connor, the Court explained that, under Section 
1983, if a particular Constitutional Amendment “provides an explicit textual 
source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government 
behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive 
due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”298  But the Court 
reasoned that a police pursuit was neither a search nor a seizure and therefore 
does not fall under a Fourth Amendment analysis but rather under the 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process protection of a person’s 
                                                 
 292. Id.  This would apply even where the child was thirty feet away from the officer and 
was walking away with his back facing the officer. 
 293. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, North Charleston Police Shooting Not Justified, Experts 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/us/north-charleston-
police-shooting-not-justified-experts-say.html?_r=2; Eric Tucker, When Can Police Use 
Lethal Force Against a Fleeing Suspect?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Apr. 8, 2015, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/can-police-use-lethal-force-fleeing-suspect/.  See 
also infra Introduction in the recent killings of Rayshard Brooks, George Floyd, and Breonna 
Taylor, the officers’ lives nor the lives of others were not at risk. 
 294. See infra Part III, B (subject to the usual due process protections including the 
presumption of innocence). 
 295. Cty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
 296. See id. at 83637 (1998). 
 297. Id. at 836. 
 298. Id. at 842. 
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life.299  Thus, the Court reiterated a substantive due process approach that 
emphasized the sanctity of life, inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
explaining that its prior cases have held the amendment to guarantee “more 
than fair process,” to include a “substantive sphere” which bars “certain 
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to 
implement them.”300 
In summary, the Graham doctrine unintentionally condones police use 
of excessive force and results in a substantial barrier to investigations and 
prosecutions of such incidents.301  The Court’s “objective reasonableness” 
standard defies reality.  Handcuffed and pinned on his stomach by three 
police officers in a chokehold for nearly nine minutes, George Floyd posed 
no threat.302  Running away from the police after a peaceful interrogation, 
Rayshard Brooks posed no threat.303  Sleeping in her bed in her home, 
Breonna Taylor posed no threat.304  Clearly, the life of the law has not been 




*  *  * 
 
                                                 
 299.  The Court stated,  
The Fourth Amendment covers only “searches and seizures,” neither of which 
took place here.  No one suggests that there was a search, and our cases foreclose 
finding a seizure.  We held in California v. Hodari D., that a police pursuit in 
attempting to seize a person does not amount to a “seizure” within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.  And in Brower v. County of Inyo, we explained that 
“a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally 
caused termination of an individual’s freedom of movement (the innocent 
passerby), nor even whenever there is a governmentally caused and 
governmentally desired termination of an individual’s freedom of movement 
(the fleeing felon), but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom 
of movement through means intentionally applied (emphasis added).”  We 
illustrated the point by saying that no Fourth Amendment seizure would take 
place where a “pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show 
of authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit,” but 
accidentally stopped the suspect by crashing into him. That is exactly this case.   
Id. at 833–845. 
 300. Cty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S.. at 840 (first quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 719 (1997); then Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). 
 301. See Obasogie et al., supra note 281, AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46, at 2. 
 302. See Hill, supra note 4. 
 303. See Oliviero et al., supra note 10. 
 304. See Campos-Flores et al., supra note 2. 
 305. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) (observing “[t]he life of 
the law has not been logic but experience”). 
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The Court’s construction of the Blue Shield—judicial doctrines of 
willful intent, qualified immunity, and objective reasonableness—makes it 
practically impossible to successfully prosecute a police officer for using 
lethal force.306  These extraordinary legal safeguards greatly protect police 
officers from being convicted for unjustified killings of Blacks.  Hence, the 
Court’s current jurisprudence on police accountability creates unequal 
justice, tilting the scales of justice by heavily weighing in favor of the 
perpetrator and against the victim. 
In response to the Court-created Blue Shield, this Article contends that, 
from the viewpoint of saving Black lives, the Court’s current doctrines are 
morally bankrupt, as they devalue life, unfairly protect rogue police officers, 
and promote reckless or wanton shootings by police officers.  It proposed the 
adoption of the GFAC which challenges the constitutionality of the authority 
and practices in the use of excessive force.  In doing so, it rightfully shifts 
the conversation from whether a particular officer’s action was justified 
under the circumstances to whether the State has the authority to take a 
person’s life pursuant to a search or an arrest.  Further, it places greater 
weight on the sanctity of life and less on over-policing of innocent suspects.  
In support of the GFAC, this Article posits that the Court’s death 
penalty jurisprudence should be the controlling authority to assess the 
constitutionality of police use of lethal force.  This thesis is fleshed out by 
(1) examining the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence and (2) arguing that 
police use of lethal force policies and practices do not comply with the 
Court’s strict restrictions on executions, as discussed next. 
 
3. The Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence Prohibits Police Use of 
Lethal Force 
 
The sanctity of life against government infringement has been 
constitutionally recognized and protected in the Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence, which arguably should apply to police use of lethal force 
cases.  The GFAC is based on the contention that the policies and practices 
of deadly force are unconstitutional violations of the Court’s death penalty 
                                                 
 306. Tom Jackman et al., Charging Officers with Crimes Is Still Difficult for Prosecutors, 
WASH. POST (May 29, 2020 7:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2020/ 
05/29/charging-cops-with-crimes-is-still-difficult-prosecutors/; Kristy Parker, Prosecute the 
Police, THE ATLANTIC (June 13, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/ 
06/prosecutors-need-to-do-their-part/612997/.  See also Mike Allen, Holder’s Parting Shot: 
It’s Too Hard to Bring Civil Rights Cases, POLITICO (Feb. 27, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www. 
politico.com/story/2015/02/eric-holder-civil-rights-interview-mike-allen-115575 (reporting 
that former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder called for lowering the legal standard for 
assessing police accountability). 
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jurisprudence.307  This contention is argued next in two parts: (1) that the 
Court has questioned whether the Government has the right to execute a 
person, moving toward abolition of the death penalty, (2) that, in the 
meanwhile, the Court has established strict restrictions of the Government’s 
taking of a person’s life, and (3) that police use of lethal force policies and 
practices do not comply with those strict restrictions.  This leads to the 
conclusion that such deadly or excessive force policies and practices are 
unconstitutional and, therefore must be abolished. 
The first point is that both Federal308 and State governments309 believe 
the government lacks the constitutional authority to take a person’s life.310  
Consequently, the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence reflects this 
uncertainty.  In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,311 the Court struck down capital 
punishment statutes, reducing all death sentences pending at the time to life 
imprisonment.312 
                                                 
 307. “Death penalty,” also known as capital punishment, is a government-sanctioned 
practice whereby a person is put to death by the State as a punishment for a crime.  See 
Defining “death penalty” jurisprudence, supra note 31. 
 308. Unfortunately, currently capital punishment is currently authorized by the federal 
government. 
 309. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state (visited Aug. 20, 2020) 
(reporting that as of 2020, twenty-eight states have the death penalty, with twenty-states and 
the District of Columbia have legislatively abolished the death penalty).  Four others, 
Colorado, Pennsylvania, California, and Oregon have suspended executions by gubernatorial 
moratorium.  The Nebraska Legislature also abolished capital punishment in 2015, but it was 
reinstated by a statewide vote in 2016; see also Staff, Colorado Becomes 22nd State to Abolish 
Death Penalty, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 25, 2020, 8:24 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/ 
news/world/americas/colorado-death-penalty-abolished-executions-
a9423146.html.Additionally, courts in Washington and Delaware recently ruled that the 
states’ capital punishment laws are unconstitutional.  See generally States and Capital 
Punishment, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 24, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/death-penalty.aspx. 
 310. See generally John Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s 
Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 GEO. CRIM. L. REV. 4 (2012) (providing a detailed analysis 
of death penalty jurisprudence, specifically around the contours of under what circumstances 
the death penalty is forbidden); The Case Against the Death Penalty, ACLU (2012), 
https://www.aclu.org/other/case-against-death-penalty (“The American Civil Liberties Union 
believes the death penalty inherently violates the constitutional ban against cruel and unusual 
punishment and the guarantees of due process of law and of equal protection under the law.  
Furthermore, we believe that the state should not give itself the right to kill human beings–
especially when it kills with premeditation and ceremony, in the name of the law or in the 
name of its people, and when it does so in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion.”). 
 311. Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 312. Id. at 240 (declaring that under then-existing laws “the imposition and carrying out 
of the death penalty . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments,” after finding that the manner in which death penalty laws had 
been applied to be “harsh, freakish, and arbitrary” as to be constitutionally unacceptable). 
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Subsequently, in 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia,313 the Court affirmed the 
legality of capital punishment,314 after many states passed new death penalty 
statutes.315  After resuming its reassessment of the constitutional parameters 
of the death penalty, the Court has absolutely prohibited the execution of 
certain classes of individuals.316  Further, on the procedural front, the Court 
decided that juries, not judges, find facts that (1) make a defendant eligible 
for capital punishment317 and (2) impose a sentence of death.318  Therefore, 
the government continues to assess whether there should be an absolute 
abolition of the death penalty, as existed in the past. 
The second point is that while reconsidering an absolute abolition of 
government executions, the Court has established very strict requirements 
on when the Government can constitutionally terminate a person’s life.319  
The Court’s Eighth Amendment “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” cases are 
the capstone of the death penalty jurisprudence.320  However, the Court’s 
                                                 
 313. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 314. Id. (reporting that “the U.S. federal government, the U.S. military, and 31 states have 
a valid death penalty statute, and over 1,400 executions have been carried in the United States 
since it reinstated the death penalty in 1976”). 
 315. See generally ACLU, supra note 309 (noting these statutes require a two-stage trial 
procedure, in which the jury first determines guilt or innocence and then chooses 
imprisonment or death in the light of aggravating or mitigating circumstances). 
 316. The Court has abolished the death penalty in several instances, ruling that the 
execution of such individuals is unconstitutional, violating cruel and usual punishment.  See 
Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986) (prohibiting the death penalty for insane 
persons), in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting execution of mentally 
retarded criminals); in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555, 578–79 (2005) (prohibiting the 
execution of minors); and in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), for those convicted 
of raping a child where death was not the intended or actual result.  State courts have also 
restricted death penalty executions.  See generally Amber Widgery, Debating the Death 
Penalty: Capital Punishment Divides Legislators, But Not Along Party Lines, STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Jan./Feb. 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/2020/ 
DeathPenalty_JanFeb_2020_SL.pdf.  See, e.g., on August 2, 2016, in Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 
430 (Del. 2016), the Delaware Supreme Court struck down the state’s death penalty statute, 
ruling that it violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016). On October 11, 2018, in State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 
631 (Wash. 2018), the Washington Supreme Court also struck down the State’s death penalty, 
ruling for the fourth time that it was unconstitutional, finding it “invalid because it is imposed 
in an arbitrary and racially biased manner,” and found that the law as applied violates Article 
I, Section 14 of the State Constitution because it fails to serve any legitimate penological goal.  
 317. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 318. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016). 
 319. See generally Death Penalty/Capital Punishment Law, MEGALAW.COM (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060614135521/http://www.megalaw.com/top/deathpenalty.php. 
 320. See Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: 
Conditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373 (1995) (describing the historical context of 
the Eighth Amendment and its application to conditions of confinement for prison reform 
litigation); Schlanger, supra note 32 (providing one of the most comprehensive reviews of 
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death penalty jurisprudence encapsulates all applicable constitutional and 
fundamental rights that protect a person’s life from government 
infringement.321 
These “pro-sanctity of life” constitutional rights can be categorized in 
a five-part process by which the government can legally execute a person: 
(1) Rights of the Accused, including a fair trial, pre-trial, speedy trial, jury 
trial, counsel, presumption of innocence, exclusionary rule, self-
incrimination, double jeopardy, defenses, juvenile status; (2) Verdict, 
including conviction, acquittal, not proven, directed verdict; (3) Sentencing, 
including mandatory, suspended, custodial, periodic, discharge, guidelines, 
totality, dangerous offender; capital punishment, execution warrant, cruel 
and unusual punishment, imprisonment, life imprisonment, indefinite 
imprisonment, three-strikes law; (4) Post-sentencing, including habeas 
appeals, parole, probation tariff, life license, miscarriage of justice, 
exoneration, pardon, recidivism, habitual offender, sex offender registration, 
sexually violent predator legislation, and (5) Execution, including methods 
of execution,322 and humane considerations.323 
Relative to the George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code, the Court’s 
prescriptions on government’s authority to take a person’s life dictates that 
the executions strictly comply with those strict, exacting requirements.  Next, 
                                                 
innate litigation including those that pertained to conditions of confinement in violation of the 
8th Amendment); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions and the Eighth Amendment, 
84 NYU L. REV. 881 (2009) (examining when prison conditions would qualify as either 
“cruel” or “unusual” and how cruelty would be captured doctrinally for Eighth Amendment 
conditions of confinement analysis).  
 321. See generally RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, ET AL., THE DEATH PENALTY: AMERICA’S 
EXPERIENCE WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2007).  
 322. See CORRECTIONS WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS 4–5 (2011) (noting that in the U.S. 
executions are typically done in non-public setting, shielded from public view behind the 
walls of the penitentiary).  Cf., Steven A. Blum, Public Executions: Understand the “Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments” Clause, 19 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 415 (Winter 2019) (describing 
the public executions in Florida and in Utah as of 1992). 
 323. In 2008, in Baze v. Rees, 553. U.S 35 (2008), the Court held that the lethal injection 
does not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment, applying an “objectively intolerable” test 
to determine if the method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and 
unusual punishments.  The legality of lethal injection was upheld in Glossip v. Gross, 576 
U.S. 863 (2015).  See also, GAIL A. VAN NORMAN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS IN 
ANESTHESIOLOGY 285–91 (2010) (reporting on a separate study published in The Lancet in 
2005 that found that in forty-three percent of cases of lethal injection, the blood level of 
hypnotics was insufficient to guarantee unconsciousness).  State courts and lower federal 
courts have refused to strike down hanging and electrocution as impermissible methods of 
execution.  See generally David Down & Jeffrey R. Newberry, Conceptual and Scientific 
Defects in the Supreme Court’s “Method of Execution” Jurisprudence, 92 YALE J. BIOL MED. 
210, 793–803 (2019) (providing a scientific analysis regarding specific methods of execution 
which may violate the Eighth Amendment). 
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we will examine the contention that the police policies authorizing lethal 
force are wrongfully licensing “executions,” subject to the Court’s death 
penalty jurisprudence. 
The third and most important point is that the police use of lethal force 
policies and practices do not comply with the Court’s exacting restrictions 
for the taking of a person’s life.324  As previously noted, the Court’s 
restrictions go beyond its Eighth Amendment cases.  For there to be a 
constitutionally-sanctioned execution, the Court requires the following 
substantive and procedural safeguards: such an execution must, at the 
minimum, (1) follow a conviction of a capital crime, (2) be mandated by a 
jury of one’s peers, (3) beyond a reasonable doubt, (4) following post-
conviction remedies, and (5) in a humane manner of execution. 
Many states have eliminated the death penalty as inhumane, noting its 
racial implications.325  Even in states where the death penalty is permitted it 
remains highly regulated.326  This begets the question, when such strict 
regulations regarding executions abound, how can the law permit a police 
officer to execute a person without a charge of a capital crime, without 
presenting defenses, without a jury of one’s peers, and oftentimes in an 
inhumane manner? 
The arguments presented for the abolition of the death penalty327 also 
apply to support the GFAC’s abolition of death by police killings: (1) police 
killings are “unusual” punishment, because the United States is the only 
western industrialized nation that engages in this punishment328 and because 
only a random sampling of people in the United States are killed by police;329 
(2) police killings, like capital punishment, deny due process of law; its 
imposition is often arbitrary,330 and always irrevocable—forever depriving 
an individual of the opportunity to benefit from new evidence or new laws 
that might warrant the reversal of a conviction, or the setting aside of a death 
sentence; (3) police killings violate the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection, as they occur randomly—and discriminatorily, imposed 
disproportionately upon those whose victims are Black, often poor and 
uneducated, and concentrated in certain geographic regions of the country;331 
                                                 
 324. See Jelani Jefferson Exum, The Death Penalty on the Streets: What the Eighth 
Amendment Can Teach About Regulating Police Use of Force, 80 MO. L. REV. 987, 1011 
(2015) (arguing that a re-conceptualization of the use of the police use of lethal force as 
punishment shows that the Eighth Amendment should apply). 
 325. See supra note 308. 
 326. Id. 
 327. See The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 309. 
 328. See infra Part I. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
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(4) police use of lethal force is clearly not a viable form of crime control, 
compared to curbing drug use, putting more officers on the street, and gun 
control;332 (5) police use of deadly force wastes limited resources, 
squandering the time and energy of courts, prosecuting attorneys, defense 
counsel, juries, and courtroom and law enforcement personnel, unduly 
burdens the criminal justice system, and thus is counterproductive as an 
instrument for society’s control of violent crime, and has resulted in higher 
insurance premiums to cover the rising cost of wrongful death civil 
actions;333 (6) police killings do irreparable harm to the victims (death), to 
their families (trauma), to the offending police officer (termination, 
suspicion, and potentially jail time), and to policing (damaged community 
relations);334 (7) police brutality demonstrates a lack of respect for human 
life, as Black lives matter and as all life is precious and as death is 
irrevocable, murder is abhorrent, and a policy of state-authorized killings is 
immoral, epitomizing the tragic inefficacy and brutality of violence, rather 
than reason, as the solution to difficult social problems. 
In summary, the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence protects a person, 
particularly a Black person, from being executed by the police use of lethal 
force. This is a more appropriate application of a constitutional principle over 
the current Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence.  The 
ongoing controversial and highly publicized police killings of Blacks sends 
a message that our society does not respect life, when it permits its officials 
to deliberately kill human beings.  These killings are executions, a violent 
public spectacle of official homicide, and one that endorses killing to solve 
social problems—the worst possible example to set for the citizenry, and 
especially children.  Overall, there are no good legal or policy reasons to 
support lethal force policies or practices, but the bloodshed and the resulting 
destruction of community decency are real. 
 
*  *  * 
 
The George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code is a constitutionally mandated 
solution to the unequal justice, which results from the Court’s three doctrines 
that compose the Blue Shield.  As analyzed in this section, the GFAC 
achieves five points, (1) it embraces the sanctity of life (2) it protects 
particularly vulnerable Black lives, (3) it bypasses the Blue Shield by 
focusing on the unconstitutionality of the authority of police to use lethal 
force, (4) it complies with the strict constitutional restrictions on the 
                                                 
 332. Id. 
 333. See The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 309. 
 334. See infra Part I. 
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government’s authority to execute a person’s life, and (5) it properly 
categorizes the use of lethal force as an execution, subject to the Eighth 
Amendment.  In addition to these bases of the Code, it addresses the 
conscious and unconscious negative impact of systemic racism, the Blue 
Code, which is discussed next.  
 
B. Systemic Racism  
 
In addition to the Court generated Blue Shield protection, police 
officers are also protected by the “Blue Code”—the combination of a 
protective police culture and systemic racism that provides additional 
safeguards for police officers who use lethal force.  The Blue Code is 
composed of six components that combined create a nearly impermeable 
barrier to police accountability, (1) police officers are protected from 
criminal liability by an unofficial but real code of silence, in which police 
officers guard each other from outside criticism, including misconduct.335 (2) 
police officer misconduct is staunchly defended by the Fraternal Order of 
Police (“FOP”), a national police union,336 which provides officers with legal 
counsel to defend them in investigations and lawsuits,337 (3) police officers 
have broad authority to investigate themselves, through their internal affairs 
division,338 (4) the principles of comity and federalism give local prosecutors 
                                                 
 335. Robert M. Myers, Code of Silence: Police Shootings and the Right to Remain Silent, 
26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497, 505 (1996). 
 336. Paul Butler, Commentary, Why the Fraternal Order of Police Must Go: The Nation’s 
Largest Police Organization does more Harm to Public Safety than Good, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Nov. 11, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/ 10/11/why-
the-fraternal-order-of-police-must-go. 
 337. Noam Scheiber, et al., How Police Unions Became Such Powerful Opponents to 
Reform Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/us/police-
unions-minneapolis-kroll.html; Steven Greenhouse, How Police Unions Enable and Conceal 
Abuses of Power, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ news-
desk/ how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses; Don Gonyea, Labor Leaders Call for 
Police Reform Even As Police Unions Face Growing Criticism, NPR (June 10, 2020 3:49 
PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/874096421/labor-leaders-call-for-police-reform-as-
they-face-criticism-for-police-union-tie; Conor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and 
Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the Street, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2014), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-unions-keep-abusive-cops-on-th 
e-street/383258/; Christopher Ingraham, Police Unions and Police Misconduct: What the 
Research Says about the Connection, WASH. POST (June 10, 2020 7:54 AM), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/10/police-unions-violence-research-george-floyd/. 
 338. See Naomi Creason, Police Departments Often Investigate Themselves in Non-Lethal 
Use-of-Force Incidents, THE SENTINEL (Apr. 19, 2015), http://cumberlink.com/news/ 
local/police-departments-often-investigate-themselves-in-non-lethal-use-of/article_5af2e65 
d-ff32-5451-9c52-adaa7eb758f2.html; Sheila McLaughlin, What Happens When Officers 
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jurisdiction to prosecute fatal shootings pursuant to local or state laws,339 (5) 
the grand jury process has also been shown to be pro-police and anti-
Blacks,340 and (6) if a police officer is indicted for committing a homicide, 
that officer will benefit from a pro-police jury.341  Relative to the pro-police 
juries, these jurors are often white, middle class, suburban citizens who see 
the police as guardians of the American way of life.342  They bring to a trial 
a pro-police, anti-Black bias, which often results in the acquittal of the police 
officer suspect.343 
Those components of the Blue Code result in faulty, biased 
investigations of the alleged wrongful use of lethal force.  This is also 
inclusive of tainted evidence and police cover-ups.344  Hence, due to these 
                                                 
Use Deadly Force?, USA TODAY (Feb. 21, 2014, 2:49 P.M.), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2014/02/21/police-deadly-force-accountability/5697611/. 
 339. See generally Flanders & Welling, supra note 206; Jason Hanna, No Charges Against 
Officers in Alton Sterling Death; Other Videos Are Coming, CNN (Mar. 27, 2018, 6:22 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/27/us/alton-sterling-investigation/index.html; David A. 
Graham, Most States Elect No Black Prosecutors, THE ATLANTIC (July 7, 2015), 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/american-prosecutors-are-incredible-white 
does-it-matter/397847/. 
 340. See Andrew Siff et al., Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer in Eric Garner 
Chokehold Death, NBC NEW YORK (Dec. 4, 2014, 1:59 PM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/ 
news/local/grand-jury-decision-eric-garner-staten-island-chokehold-death-nypd/1427980/; 
Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police Brutality in America: Direct 
and Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as Remedies for Victims of Police Brutality When the 
Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L. REV. 271, 296–97 (1994); see also Roger A. 
Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of Unjustified Police Killings—
Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397, 410 (2017) (recommending 
reforms of the grand jury system for cases involving police use of lethal force). 
 341. See Maura Dolan, California Prosecutors Routinely Strike Black and Latino People 
from Juries, Report Says, L.A. TIMES (last updated June 15, 2020, 11:02 am), https://www. 
latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-15/prosecutors-strike-black-latino-jurors-report. 
 342. Janell Ross, How Big of a Difference Does an All-White Jury Make? A Leading 
Expert Explains, WASH. POST (May 30, 2016 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/30/how-big-a-difference-does-an-all-white-jury-make-a-lead 
ing-expert-explains/. 
 343. See Samira Puskar et al., 3 Chicago Officers Acquitted of Covering Up for Colleague 
Who Shot Laquan McDonald, NBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://www.nbc 
news.com/news/us-news/chicago-officers-found-not-guilty-attempted-cover-laquan-mcdon 
ald-killing-n959411; Phoebe Ellsworth, et al., Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt 
and Dispositional Attributions, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 11, 1367-79 (2000); 
Ashish S. Joshi et al., Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with Individual 
Consequences, ABA (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/comm 
ittees/diversity-inclusion/articles/2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individual-
consequences/.  
 344. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE USE OF FORCE: AN EXAMINATION OF 
MODERN POLICING PRACTICES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/11-15-
Police-Force.pdf. 
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six components of the Blue Code, there is usually a finding that the use of 
force was justified, with reliance on the testimony of the police officer who 
committed the shooting.345 
Relative to the principles of comity and federalism, the typical 
investigation and charges are primarily a matter of local control and pursuant 
to local or state laws.346  As local prosecutors work closely with and rely on 
the cooperation of police officers in prosecuting other criminal matters, they 
arguably face unresolvable conflicts of interest in investigating and 
prosecuting police for alleged misconduct.347 
The Blue Code functions as the ultimate protection of police 
misconduct, as it reflects and supports systemic racism.348  It also condones 
the policies and practices that in most states and under common law rules, 
permit police to use deadly force when the officer reasonably believes a 
suspect poses a significant threat of serious bodily injury or death to 
themselves or others.349  Some states have the use of deadly force statute 
included within a larger use of force statute, while others cover deadly force 
in their “justifiable homicide” statute, which applies to both law enforcement 
officers and private citizens.350 
Relative to systemic racism, the federal government has investigated 
several police departments’ lethal force policies and practices.351  These 
investigations concluded that the use of excessive lethal force was prevalent 
                                                 
 345. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Police Shootings, Race, and the Fear Defense, NEW 
YORKER (July 12, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/benjamin-wallace-wells/police-
shootings-race-and-the-fear-defense. See generally Creason, supra note 339. 
 346. Id. 
 347. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 5, 128, 150–51, 180–81 (2009); Angela J. Davis, Justice for Michael Brown 
Rests Almost Entirely in the Hands of This One Man, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 18, 2014), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/119123/ferguson-missouri-prosecutor-does-he-have-too-
much-power; Simone Weichselbaum, The Problems with Policing the Police, TIME, 
http://time.com/police-shootings-justice-department-civil-rights-investigations/ (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2019); Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447 
(2016). 
 348. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Barr Says There Is No Systemic Racism in Policing, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/us/politics/justice-department-
barr-racism-police.html. 
 349. That also applies to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon when the officer believes 
escape would pose a significant threat of serious bodily injury or death to members of the 
public.  See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 46, at 2. 
 350. Id. at 2, 9, 21. 
 351. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 93; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Calls for Changes 
in Policing After Task Force Report, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/03/03/us/politics/obama-calls-for-changes-in-policing-after-task-force-report.html 
(reporting that President Obama said that requiring independent investigations when the 
police use lethal force, would be “controversial”). 
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in some police departments along with patterns of civil rights violations.352  
In response, the federal government sued several local police departments 
and negotiated consent decrees to ensure police accountability.353  In 2017, 
these investigations of police departments were halted by the President 
Donald J. Trump Administration,354 likely erasing years of positive police 
reforms.355 
Therefore, the Blue Code and systemic racism work hand in hand to 
ensure that white police officers are seldom, if ever, found guilty for killing 
Black people, which leads to the question, is this failure of equal justice 
deliberate? 
                                                 
 352. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 23 
(2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download (finding Chicago police officers 
have a pattern of using excessive force). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S COMMUNITY POLICING REPORT 2015-2016 3 (2017), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/press-release/file/925431/download; Matt Stroud et al., A ‘Pattern or Practice’ of 
Violence in America, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
graphics/2015-doj-and-police-violence/. 
 353. See Jerry Abramson, 10 Cities Making Real Progress Since the Launch of the 21st 
Century Policing Task Force, WHITE HOUSE (May 18, 2015, 7:26 PM), https://www.white 
house.gov/blog/2015/05/18/10-cities-making-real-progress-launch-21st-century-policing-
task-force; Accomplishments Under the Leadership of Attorney General Eric Holder, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/doj/accomplishments-under-
leadership-attorney-general-eric-holder (“Since 2009, the Department has opened more than 
20 investigations state and local law enforcement agencies regarding civil patterns or practices 
in violation of the Constitution or federal law… the largest number of law enforcement 
agencies being reviewed at any one time in the history of the Department.”); cf. Sarah 
Wheaton et al., Police Union Accuses White House of Politicizing Cop Safety, Obama 
Administration Has Announced Plan to Restrict Police Forces’ Access to Military Gear, 
POLITICO (May 18, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/white-house-
limiting-military-equipment-for-police-118041 (noting opposition to the Obama 
Administration’s proposed changes from the nation’s largest police union). 
 354. Then U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that “in recent years, . . . law 
enforcement as a whole has been unfairly maligned and blamed for the crimes and 
unacceptable deeds of a few bad actors.” U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE NEWS, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS DELIVERS KEYNOTE REMARKS AT THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF CHIEFS OF POLICE DIVISION MIDYEAR CONFERENCE, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ 
attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-keynote-remarks-international-association-chiefs 
(last updated Apr. 11, 2017). 
 355. See John Byrne et al., Concerns Mount over Chicago Cop Reform as Sessions Vows 
to ‘Pull Back’, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 1, 2017, 5:30 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/local/politics/ct-emanuel-sessions-consent-decree-react-met-20170228-story.html; 
Eric Lichtblau, Sessions Indicates Justice Department Will Stop Monitoring Troubled Police 
Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/jeff-
sessions-crime.html?_r=0; Pete Williams, AG Sessions Says DOJ to ‘Pull Back’ on Police 
Department Civil Rights Suits, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017, 1:52 PM), http://www.nbcnews. 
com/news/us-news/ag-sessions-says-trump-administration-pull-back-police-department-civ 
il-n726826. 
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C. Lynching  
 
To appreciate the Black Lives Matter Movement, this Article critically 
analyzes the context of the white police officers’ killings of Blacks in light 
of the State-sanctioned violence and the State deprivation of the human 
rights and dignity of all Blacks, which is discussed next. 
Previously, this Article contended that the police use of lethal force 
violates the victim’s protection against Cruel and Unusual Punishment. In 
what follows, this Article argues that the abuse of that right is more suspect 
when the perpetrator is a white male police officer and the victim is a Black 
person.  As such, the police killing of Blacks in such a blatant, unabashed, 
and authorized manner constitutes modern-day lynching and is a key 
component of systemic racism.356 
This section begins with an analysis of lynching and its role in racial 
oppression.  Lynching was often used throughout our Nation’s dark history 
to kill, punish, and subrogate Black people.357  Usually, this was in a violent 
public display, where whites terrorized and traumatized Blacks in order to 
enforce racial subordination and segregation.358 
Certain elements must be present for a lynching.  Specifically, it is (1) 
an act of violence; (2) under the pretext of administering justice without trial, 
(3) an execution of a presumed offender; (4) with use of torture and corporal 
mutilation; and (5) to instill fear and to promote white supremacy.359  
Further, lynching or “lynch law” is where a self-constituted court imposes a 
death sentence on a person without due process of law.360 
                                                 
 356. Martin Luther King III, a leading Black Lives advocate, concluded that when a police 
officer kills a Black person, that officer is acting illegally as judge, jury, and executioner.  See 
Andrew Naughtie, George Floyd Death: Martin Luther King III Says Police Acted as ‘Judge, 
Jury and Executioner’, THE INDEPENDENT UK (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/george-floyd-martin-luther-king-son-
police-riots-bbc-interview-a9542151.html. 
 357. See also EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE 
LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR (3d ed. 2017), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/lynch 
ing-in-america-3d-ed-080219.pdf (documenting more than 4,400 racial terror lynchings in the 
United States during the period between Reconstruction and World War II). 
 358. Over the years, lynching was frequently supported by various State and federal law 
enforcement officials, and traumatized Blacks throughout the country. Even to this day, 
Congress has not been able to enact an anti-lynching statue.  See Tal Kopan, Sen. Kamala 
Harris’ Anti-Lynching Bill Caught in Police Reform Fight, S.F. CHRONICLE (June 23, 2020, 
6:59 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Kamala-Harris-anti-lynching-bill-
caught-in-15361078.php.    
 359. See Geoffrey Abbott, Lynching, Mob Violence, BRITANNICA, https://www.britan 
nica.com/topic/lynching (“Lynching, The term ‘lynch law’ refers to a self-constituted court 
that imposes sentence on a person without due process of law.”). 
 360. See id. (noting the terms derived from the name of Charles Lynch (1736-96), a 
Virginia enslaver of people of African descent). 
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The contemporary police killings of Blacks exhibit all of the elements 
of a lynching.  Specifically, they are (1) act of violence, whether by shooting 
or chokehold; (2) committed under the pretext of administrating justice such 
as responding to a person who is resisting arrest; (3) executing a presumed 
offender, such as a presumption that George Floyd knowingly passed a 
phony twenty dollar bill; (4) with the use of torture such as kneeling on 
George Floyd’s throat for nearly nine minutes, while handcuffed and lying 
on his back; and (5) to instill fear and to promote white supremacy as seen 
in the political fallout in support of the police’s actions.361 
The Black Lives Matter Movement has emphasized that the police 
killing of Blacks is a key component of systemic racism, which makes Black 
lives less valued in our society.362  In addition to those killings, the legal 
system continues to support and reflect centuries of overt and unconscious 
racial oppression and discrimination against Blacks, particularly males.363  
Systemic racism is evidenced by the financial disparities in the Black 
community.364 
The criminal justice system plays a key role, if not the key role, in 
systemic racism.  That includes mass incarceration,365 a broken criminal 
                                                 
 361. Zack Beauchamp, What the Police Really Believe: Inside the Distinctive, Largely 
Unknown Ideology of American Policing and How It Justifies Racist Violence, VOX (July 7, 
2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/7/7/21293259/police-racis 
m-violence-ideology-george-floyd. 
 362. See supra note 15.  See, e.g., Christina Pazzanese, The Fire This Time, THE HARVARD 
GAZETTE (June 2, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/06/lawrence-d-bobo-
examines-police-killings-of-black-men/; Lydia Denworth, A Civil Rights Expert Explains the 
Social Science of Police Racism, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (June 4, 2020), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-civil-rights-expert-explains-the-social-science-
of-police-racism/. 
 363. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Critical Perspectives on Police, Policing, and Mass 
Incarceration, 104 GEO. L. J. 1531 (2016) (positing that the imprisonment of African-
American men is one means by which society removes minority populations from mainstream 
life). 
 364. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Opinion, The Black-White Wage Gap Is as Big as It Was 
in 1950, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/opinion/race-
wage-gap.html (reporting that recent research indicates little progress since the Truman 
administration). 
 365. The United States incarcerates two million people, which is more than any other 
country.  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION 
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (10th ed. 2010). 
BLACK LIVES MATTER: BANNING POLICE LYNCHINGS 
Fall 2020 BLACK LIVES MATTER 65 
justice system,366 racial disparities,367 and the economic devastation of 
communities of color.368  Relative to policing, there are many features of 
systemic racism including: capital punishment,369 racial profiling,370 
institutional racism,371 unconscious bias,372 mass incarceration,373 the war on 
drugs,374 reform of the criminal justice system,375 the criminalization of 
misdemeanors,376 and discriminatory over-policing,377 shooter bias 
                                                 
 366. See also Peter Wagner et al., Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017, PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html (last 
visited July 22, 2019) (cautioning that “being locked up is just one piece of the larger pie of 
correctional control.  There are another 840,000 people on parole (a type of conditional release 
from prison) and a staggering 3.7 million people on probation (what is typically an alternative 
sentence).  Given the often-onerous conditions of probation, policymakers should be cautious 
of ‘alternatives to incarceration’ that can easily widen the net of criminalization to people who 
are not a threat to public safety.”). 
 367. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 689 (2016) (noting “[d]espite that legalization, marijuana usage continues to 
disproportionately impose serious consequences on racial minorities, while white 
entrepreneurs and white users enjoy the early fruits of legalization.”). 
 368. See Candace Caruthers, When the Cops Become the Robbers: The Impact of Asset 
Forfeiture on Blacks and How to Curtail Asset Forfeiture Abuses, 62 HOW. L.J. 277 (2018); 
Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors Prison, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 2 (2018). 
 369. See, e.g., Daniel G. Bird, Note, Life on the Line: Pondering the Fate of a Substantive 
Due Process Challenge to the Death Penalty,” 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2003); Matthew 
R. Doherty, The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity: The Retroactive Application of Laws in 
Death Penalty Collateral Review Cases, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 445 (2004). 
 370. See, e.g., End Racial Profiling Act of 2015, H.R. 1933, 114th Cong. (2015), 
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on April 22, 2015, https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1933; Carbado & Rock, supra note 58. 
 371. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, Symposium, Whren at Twenty: Systematic Racial Bias and 
the Criminal Justice System, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 923 (2016). 
 372. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson et al., Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 115 (2016); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias 
in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013). 
 373. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 362 (positing that the imprisonment of Black men is 
one means by which society removes minority populations from mainstream life). 
 374. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or 
Why the “War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381 (2002). 
 375. See, e.g., Michele L. Jawando & Chelsea Parsons, 4 Ideas That Could Begin to 
Reform the Criminal Justice System and Improve Police-Community Relations, CENTER FOR 
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-
liberties/report/2014/12/18/103578/4-ideas-that-could-begin-to-reform-the-criminal-justice-
system-and-improve-police-community-relations/; Dukanovic, supra note 51. 
 376. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
1055 (2015). 
 377. See L. M. VAN HET LOO ET AL, CANNABIS POLICY, IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES 
(2003) (stating that statistics show that controlling cannabis use leads in many cases to 
selective law enforcement, which increases the chances of arresting people from certain 
ethnicities.  For example, while Blacks and Hispanics constitute about twenty percent of 
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studies,378 and masculinity studies.379  Further, Blacks, particularly males, 
are disproportionally unemployed,380 under-educated,381 and underpaid even 
when overeducated.382 
This Article contends that the George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code is a 
compelling response to the constitutional protection against “cruel and 
unusual punishments,” which is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  This 
contention is based on the premise that police policies and practices on using 
lethal force constitute modern-day lynching; that they are State-sponsored 
executions and, therefore, subject to the strict requirements in death penalty 
cases. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Despite the overwhelming constitutional and policy bases for banning 
police use of lethal force, there are critiques to such an approach.  Next, this 
section briefly responds to two positions against the proposed solution, the 
GFAC.  The first critique is that police killings are not executions and, 
therefore, are not subject to death penalty jurisprudence.  The second 
criticism is that the GFAC strips police officers of the means to protect 
themselves and others from imminent threats to their lives and the lives of 
                                                 
cannabis users in the U.S., they accounted for fifty-eight percent of cannabis offenders 
sentenced under federal law in 1994). 
 378. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1314, 1314–29 (2002); Saul Miller et al., The Basis of Shooter Biases: Beyond Cultural 
Stereotypes, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1358 (2012) (finding that participants 
with strong beliefs about interpersonal threats were more likely to mistakenly shoot outgroup 
members than in-group members). 
 379. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, America’s Police Culture Has a Masculinity Problem, 
THE CONVERSATION (July 19, 2016, 6:07 AM), https://theconversation.com/americas-police-
culture-has-a-masculinity-problem-62666. 
 380. See, e.g., Black Male Millennial Unemployment and Mental Health, AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (Aug. 2018), https://www.apa.org/advocacy/health-dispariti 
es/black-male-unemployment.pdf; Katelyn Burns, The Unemployment Rate Improved in May, 
But Left Black Workers Behind, VOX (June 6, 2020 5:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2020/6/6/21282611/black-workers-left-behind-unemployment. 
 381. See generally Dionne Rosser-Mims et al., Swimming Upstream: Black Males in 
Adult Education, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ADULT AND CONTINUING EDUCATION (No. 144, 2014). 
 382. See generally Michelle F. Davis, Black and White on Wall Street: The Unwritten 
Code on Race, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2020, 5:00 AM), (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
features/2020-06-29/rules-of-working-on-wall-street-from-black-employees-who-lived-it?u 
tm_campaign=news&utm_medium=bd&utm_source=applenews; Dion Rabouin, The Myth 
of Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Through Education, Axios (June 29, 2020), https:// 
www.axios.com/racial-wealth-gap-ten-myths-d14fe524-fec6-41fc-9976-0be71bc23aec.html. 
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others.  Each critique is accompanied by a response, which provides how the 
benefits of the solution outweigh its possible shortcomings. 
First, some critics of the GFAC might argue that it is fatally flawed 
because it is based upon the premise that the police lethal force policies and 
practices constitute an “execution,” subject to Eighth Amendment death 
penalty jurisprudence.  Accordingly, this Article contends that unjustified 
use of lethal force by police officers is a wrongful infringement of the right 
to life and should be abolished.  If, following the abolition, a police officer 
uses lethal force, that officer will be judged as an ordinary citizen, without 
the protection of qualified immunity or Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure jurisprudence.  To be more explicit, if after abolition, a police officer 
is accused of an unjustified shooting of a person, the GFAC seeks to shift the 
burden of proof to the police officer who uses lethal force to prove the force 
was factually justified, in response to a threat on his life or on the lives of 
others. 
Second, some critics of the GFAC argue that the GFAC strips police 
officers of the legal right to defend themselves and others from imminent 
threat.  The answer is even with the abolition of the use of lethal force, police 
officers would still have the right to self-defense under state laws.  Simply, 
the GFAC allows for the use of State self-defense laws.383  Furthermore, if a 
police officer reasonably believed his or her life, or the life of another, was 
being threatened at that time, then the officer is freed from civil liability for 
the use of lethal force.384  This is consistent with the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, which protects officers from civil liability in instances where 
“their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”385  Following the 
enactment of the GFAC, a police officer who uses lethal force would not be 
protected by the qualified immunity doctrine. 
Therefore, the GFAC is both constitutionally mandated and good public 
policy.  Contrary to critics, the GFAC does not leave officers totally 
defenseless.  The GFAC does not incorrectly assume that the police use of 
lethal force is a State-sponsored execution and does not unduly put police 
officers’ lives at risk.  Neither of these allegations negates the positive impact 
of the GFAC in protecting the sanctity of life.  Instead, the GFAC subjects 
police officers to the same standards and defense of an ordinary citizen. 
 
                                                 
 383. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of 
Property, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 401–07 (2007) (providing state constitutional 
provisions that expressly state that the right to defend life is a constitutional right, either as 
inalienable, inherent, natural or God given). 
 384. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (civil action for deprivation of rights). 
 385. See infra Part III, A. 
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Conclusion 
 
It is time to end the reign of terror against Blacks and abolish the 
unconstitutional, reckless police use of lethal force.  The George Floyd Anti-
Lynching Code is a necessary solution to redress the Blue Shield and the 
Blue Code, which operate to systemically protect and condone the use of 
lethal force.  Currently, the system creates a double standard, one for the 
public and another for police officers, sparking a demand for equal justice.  
Further, the fact that police officers are rarely prosecuted for killing 
Blacks raises vexing questions about the morality and constitutionality of the 
police officers’ authority to use lethal force. That reality creates a 
challenging conundrum for Black Lives Matter advocates on how to save 
lives while promoting community policing. Consequently, notwithstanding 
the Black Lives Matter Movement, police officers will continue to kill 
Blacks; unless we embrace a transformative intervention. 
The continuous struggle for equal justice is supported by the sanctity of 
life principles found in the Constitution.  This Article challenges the current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which focuses on the regulation of police use 
of lethal force, over the sanctity of life. It defends the principle that if the 
State has the constitutional authority to take a life, such a punishment must 
comply with very strict constitutional constraints, as provided by the Court 
in its death penalty jurisprudence protection against “cruel and unusual 
punishment,” under the Eighth Amendment. 
If Black lives matter, and they do, then we must redress systemic 
racism—by eradicating racist policies and practice from policing.  By 
immediately abolishing the police use of all lethal force tactics, particularly 
shootings and chokeholds, we will save the lives of all Americans and prove 
that Black lives really do matter. 
Without the GFAC, we will continue to repeat the question, “Do Black 
lives really matter?”386  Without the GFAC, we will continue to suffer from 
the horrific cycle of additional police killings, followed by anger, more 
protests, and riots—“no justice, no peace.”    
 
 
                                                 
 386. Tim Arango, In Los Angeles, the Ghosts of Rodney King and Watts Rise Again, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/us/rodney-king-george-floyd-
los-angeles.html; Anjuli Sastry & Karen Grigsby Bates, When LA Erupted in Anger: A Look 
Back at the Rodney King Riots, NPR (Apr. 26, 2017 1:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2017/04/26/524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-the-rodney-king-riots; 
Jennifer Medina, The L.A. Riots 25 Years Later: A Return to the Epicenter, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/us/la-riots-rodney-king-south-central-19 
92.html.  
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*  *  * 
 
Addendum I: The George Floyd Anti-Lynching Code (the 
“GFAC”) 
 
As noted in Part II of the Article, the following is a proposed code that 
the government, courts, and policymakers should adopt to provide past, 
present, and would-be victims of police use of lethal force with the protection 




Recognizing the symbiotic relationship between the police and the 
community, any solution to reform police practice seeks to reach two 
interrelated goals: (1) to protect persons from the use of lethal force by police 
officers, and (2) to renew public confidence in the integrity of policing.  
To achieve these goals, it is proposed that the government, at all levels, 
including Congress, the federal judiciary, and the Executive branches, as 
well as state and local governments, absolutely prohibit the police use of 
lethal force.  Specifically, it views such force as an execution and a modern-
day form of lynching. 
The Constitution, public policy, and morality demand that police 
officers be banned from using lethal force.  Further, equal justice demands 
that an offending police officer be held criminally liable, contrary to 
qualified immunity and current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Specifically, it requires that any police officer who kills a person be judged 
as if that officer were acting as an ordinary citizen, without the benefit of 
qualified immunity.  It also mandates a thorough, federal investigation and, 
where appropriate, prosecution of all incidents of police use of lethal force.  
To behave otherwise would arguably violate the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  Furthermore, under the Fifth 
and the Fourteenth Amendments, the government has a solemn and sworn 
duty to act to protect the private citizen against all wrongful governmental 
infringements of the fundamental right to life.  
The legislative solution is proposed herein as the George Floyd Anti-
Lynching Code (the “GFAC”), which provides as follows: 
 
B. The Provisions 
 
Whereas, there is a cultural and political shift relating to the police use 
of lethal force; 
Whereas, there are ongoing efforts at every level of government to 
address the negative impacts on our criminal justice system, including racial 
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inequities, wasted resources in the policing, prosecution, and incarceration 
of such offenses in crowded prison conditions, and the collateral 
consequences of these offenses;  
Whereas, systemic racism has produced negative, collateral damage to 
the lives of millions of Americans, creating a second-class citizenry; 
Whereas, African Americans have been victims of racial injustice for 
centuries and suffer continuous harm by such past criminalization, 
imprisonment, or collateral consequences of having a criminal record;  
Whereas, African Americans have been victims of centuries of racial 
injustice have and continue to be harmed by such past criminalization, 
imprisonment, or collateral consequences of having a criminal record and 
there is a recognized need to reconcile these past racial injustices;      
Whereas, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a right to be protected 
against Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the death penalty, pursuant to the 
Eighth Amendment;  
Whereas, the U.S. Constitution embraces the fundamental principle of 
the sanctity of life, with due process protection against wrongful 
infringement and the substantive due process through the penumbra of the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution; 
Whereas, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the government from killing a person, without due 
process and in a humane manner; 
Whereas, a police officer’s use of lethal focus violated the due process 
of a person, as it is an execution without a trial by jury, legal representation, 
and the presumption of innocence; 
Whereas, incidents of police use of lethal force negatively impact the 
policing function, creating distrust between police and the communities they 
serve; 
Whereas, existing federal legislation creates a federal crime when a 
state actor wrongfully takes the life of a citizen; and 
Whereas, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress 
the authority to enact this legislation.387 
Therefore, It Is Hereby Pronounced that the GFAC provides as follows:  
(1) All levels and branches of government, to the highest extent of their 
powers and authorities, are hereby mandated to abolish all forms of use of 
lethal force.  This mandate is self-evident and does not require supplemental 
action other than the immediate endeavors needed to facilitate these 
requisites.  
                                                 
 387. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
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(2) The Justice Department is hereby mandated to investigate each and 
every death of any person in the custody or under investigation or arrest by 
the police. 
In the GFAC, the term “lethal force,” shall be defined as the amount of 
force deployed by a police officer that is likely to cause either serious bodily 
harm or death to another person, or actually causes serious injury or death to 
another person.  Examples of mechanisms of lethal force includes, but is not 
limited to, shooting of firearms, chokehold, strangulation, stun guns aka 
tasers, shooting rubber bullets, attack dogs, the injection of ketamine, 
aggravated assault, simple battery, no-knock raids, and failing to come to a 
person’s aid in a timely manner. 
The GFAC shall be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.  The legal standard 
for assessing criminal liability shall be whether the police officer who used 
lethal force did so in self-defense and/or in response to imminent lethal harm 
to another.  The police officer will be considered innocent until proven 
guilty.  This statute does not change the mens rea element needed to prove a 
case of murder or involuntary manslaughter or other criminality under state 
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*** 
